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ABSTRACT

KNOWLEDGE OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
AFFECTING EDUCATION HELD BY SELECTED
TENNESSEE PUBLIC SCHOOL PERSONNEL
by
William P. Abegglen

The purpose of this study was to determine the knowledge o£ United
States Supreme Court decisions affecting education possessed by public
school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board members} to
determine if significant differences existed among these groups in their
knowledge of Supreme Court decisions affecting education; and to
determine if significant differences existed within each group depending
on years of experience in education and level of education.
Five hundred randomly selected subjects from the public school
systems in Tennessee were asked to indicate their knowledge of Supreme
Court decisions affecting education by completing the survey instrument,
Supreme Court Decisions Impacting on Education. This instrument
measured respondents' knowledge of Supreme Court decisions in five areas:
(1) student rights; (2) employee rights; (3) church-state relationships;
(4) race, language, and sex discrimination; and (5) school finance and
organization. A total of 241 (48.2%) usable responses were returned.
The data revealed that there was a general lack of knowledge of
Supreme Court decisions affecting education. Significant differences
were found to exist among the four groups in all areas except that of
race, language, and sex discrimination.
Superintendents scored significantly higher than teachers and board
members in knowledge of Supreme Court decisions in the area of student
rights. Superintendents and principals scored significantly higher than
teachers in the area of employee rights. Superintendents scored
significantly higher than all other groups in the area of chur.ch-state
relationships. In the area of school finance and organization,
superintendents and principals scored significantly higher than teachers.
On overall knowledge of Supreme Court decisions affecting education,
superintendents and principals scored significantly higher than teachers
and board members.
Years of experience in education was not found to be a significant
factor within any of the four groups. Level of education was found to be
a significant factor among superintendents. Superintendents with either
a doctoral degree or a Master's degree plus additional coursework scored
iii

significantly higher than those with a Master's degree or an Education
Specialist degree. Level of education was not found to be a significant
factor within any other group.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction

Since education is not mentioned in the United States Constitution#
it is presumed to be a function of the states by virtue of the Tenth
Amendment.

However# educational practices, policies, and procedures must

conform to the principles stated in the Constitution.

To assure this

conformity the courts have played an increasingly significant role in
establishing legal principles which serve as guidelines for the daily
operation of our nation's public schools.
Since 1950 there has been a marked increase in the number of case
and statutory laws pertaining to the governance of public schools.
Federal, state, and local governing bodies have all introduced
legislation on their respective levels to provide guidelines for the
operation of the schools.

It is the responsibility of the courts to

provide assurances that this legislation is in compliance with the United
States Constitution.
John C. Hogan (1974) outlines the history of the American court
system's evolving role in matters pertaining to education.
five stages of evolution.

He identified

The first stage was that of judicial

laissez faire, during which the courts generally ignored education.

This

stage lasted from 1789 until 1850*

Hogan identified the second stage as

that of state control of education.

In this period, from 1850 to 1950,

the state courts claimed that education was exclusively a matter for the
states.

During this stage there was little federal court involvement in

1

matters pertaining to education.

The third stage in Hogan's outline was

the reformation stage, which began in 1950 and continues to the present.
In this stage the federal court system, and particularly the United
States Supreme Court, became aware that many of the educational policies
and practices developed during the second stage were not in compliance
with federal constitutional requirements.

The fourth stage of evolution

is that of "education under supervision of the courts" which is
concurrent with the reformation stage.

Since the federal courts have

become aware of the many educational policies and practices that
contradict federal requirements, they have "begun to expand the scope of
their powers over the schools."

In this stage the federal government,

and especially the United States Supreme Court, has been more assertive
in its control over educational administration, organization, and
programs.

The fifth stage, the stage of "strict construction," began

with the landmark decision in school finance, the San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez case of 1973.

In this decision the Supreme

Court declared that education is not among the rights guaranteed by our
federal constitution (pp. 5-14).
Jackson M. Drake stated that from 1789 to 1888 there were only three
decisions rendered by the United States Supreme Court that resulted in
any significant changes in the administration of schools.

In the sixty

years that followed (1889 through 1948) there were twenty-two decisions
handed down that had implications for educational administration.

Since

1949 there has been a substantial increase in the number of Supreme Court
cases relating to the governance of schools (ERIC ED 168 192).

Statement of the Problem
The problem of this study was to determine the knowledge of United
States Supreme Court decisions affecting education possessed by public
school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board members in
Tennessee.

Significance of the Study
The legal principles established by the United States Supreme Court
should be of interest to all individuals involved in the educational
enterprise, whether at the instructional, policy-making, or
policy-implementing level.

Because of the ever-increasing number of

lawsuits being filed against public school teachers, administrators, and
board members, it is a matter of paramount importance that these
individuals be knowledgeable in matters relating to school law.

If

teachers, administrators, and board members are to- avoid litigation they
must be familiar with and implement only those policies and practices
which are in compliance with the law.

Unfortunately, school leaders are

often not very knowledgeable about legal matters pertaining to
education (Zirkel, 1978c).
The findings of this study should provide insight into the existing
state of knowledge of Supreme Court decisions affecting education and
provide direction for removing some of the deficiencies which may exist.
The findings might also indicate the need for prescriptive measures to
be implemented in preservice and in-service programs for public school
teachers, administrators, and board members.

Research Hypotheses
Given the statement of the problem and the findings from the review
of related literature*
1.

There will

the following hypotheses were formulated:

be a significant

difference

amongpublic school

teachers* principals* superintendents* and board members in the amount
of knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions
affecting education
2.

There will

in the area of student rights and responsibilities.
be a significant

difference

amongpublic school

teachers* principals* superintendents* and board members in the amount
of knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions
affecting education in the area of employee rights and responsibilities.
3.

There will be a significant difference among public school

teachers* principals* superintendents* and board members in the amount
of knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions
affecting education in the area of church and state relationships.
4.

There will be a significant difference among public school

teachers* principals, superintendents, and board members in the amount
of knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions
affecting education in the area of race* language, and sex discrimination.
5.

There will be a significant difference among public school

teachers* principals* superintendents* and board members in the amount
of knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions
affecting education in the area of school district finance and organization.
€.

There will be a significant difference among public school

teachers* principals* superintendents* and board members in the overall

knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions
affecting education.
7.

There will be a significant difference in the amount of

knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting
education demonstrated by public school teachers with one to five, six
to ten, eleven to fifteen, sixteen to twenty, and twenty-one or more
years of experience in education.
8.

There will be a significant difference in the amount of

knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting
education demonstrated by public school principals with one to five, six
to ten, eleven to fifteen, sixteen to twenty, and twenty-one or more
years of experience
9.

There will

in education.
be a significant

differencein the

amountof

knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting
education demonstrated by public school superintendents with one to five,
six to ten, eleven to fifteen, sixteen to twenty, and twenty-one or more
years of experience
10.

There will

in education.
be a significant

differenceinthe

amountof

knowledgo about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting
education demonstrated by public Bchool board members with one to five,
six to ten, eleven to fifteen, sixteen to twenty, and twenty-one or more
years of experience in education.
11.

There will be a significant difference in the amount of

knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting
education demonstrated by public school teachers with a high school
diploma, a baccalaureate degree, a Master's degree, a Master's degree

plus additional coursework, an Education Specialist's degree, and a
doctoral degree.
12.

There will be a significant difference in the amount of

knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting
education demonstrated by public school principals with a high school
diploma, a baccalaureate degree, a Master's degree, a Master's degree
plus additional coursework, an Education Specialist's degree, and a
doctoral degree.
13.

There will be a significant difference in the amount of

knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting
education demonstrated by public school superintendents with a high
school diploma, a baccalaureate degree, a Master's degree, a Master's
degree plus additional coursework, an Education Specialist's degree,
and a doctoral degree.
14.

There will be a significant difference in the amount of

knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting
education demonstrated by public school board members with a high school
diploma, a baccalaureate degree, a Master's degree, a Master's degree
plus additional coursework, an Education Specialist's degree, and a
doctoral degree.

Limitations

The following limitations were imposed on this study:
1.

The amount of knowledge of Supreme Court decisions affecting

education actually possessed by those responding to the survey was
limited to those cases measured by the Supreme Court Decisions Impacting
on Education instrument.

2.

The participants in the study were limited to randomly selected

teachers, principals, superintendents, and board members in public school
systems within the state of Tennessee.
3.

The items included in the instrument were limited to United

States Supreme Court cases and did not deal with decisions handed down
by lower courts.
4.

The items included in the instrument were limited to Supreme

Court decisions affecting public elementary and secondary schools.

Assumptions
The following assumptions were considered to be pertinent to this
study:
1.

The Supreme Court Decisions Impacting on Education instrument

(Appendix B) was an instrument which provided an accurate measure of the
respondents' knowledge of United States Supreme Court decisions affecting
education.
2.

The responses of the public school teachers, principals,

superintendents, and board members surveyed were based on the respondents'
true knowledge of landmark Supreme Court decisions affecting education.
3.

There was a difference in the levels of knowledge of United

States Supreme Court decisions affecting education among the different
groups of respondents.

Definitions of Terms
Parens patriae
The term applied to the sovereign power of the government as
guardian over incompetent persons, such as minors and the mentally insane.

Literally, the term means "parent of the country."

Per curiam
An opinion concurred in by all the members of the court, but without
disclosing the name of any particular justice as its author.

Literally,

the term means "by the court."

Public school personnel
In this study the term "public school personnel" is operationally
defined as including public school teachers, principals, superintendents,
and board members.

Organization of the Study
Chapter 1 contains the introduction, the statement of the problem,
the significance of the study, the research hypotheses, the limitations,
the assumptions, the definitions of terms and the organization of the
study.
Chapter 2 contains the review of the literature.
Chapter 3 contains a description of the design and procedures used
in the study.
Chapter 4 contains an analysis of the data gathered in the
study.
Chapter 5 contains the findings and recomnendations. A brief
summary of the study is presented.

CHAPTER 2
Review of the Literature

Introduction
The literature related to the legal aspects of education and the
impact of the United States Supreme Court in matters relating to
education is reviewed in this chapter.

The first section of the chapter

includes a review of the literature regarding the need for those
involved in the educational process to become more knowledgeable of
their legal rights and responsibilities.

Further, this section examines

the status of teacher education programs with regard to their instruction
in matters of the law and its impact on educational issues.
Section two presents an examination of the literature with regard to
the five areas of Supreme Court decisions which impact on educational
issues.

The five areas identified are as follows:

(a) student rights

and responsibilities; (b) employee rights and responsibilities; (c) church
and state relationships; (d) race, language, and sex discrimination; and
(e) school district finance and organization.
In conducting this review of the literature, a variety of sources,
including, but not limited to, the following, were used:
1.

Educational Resources Information Center.

2.

Education journals.

3.

Textbooks on educational law.

4.

United States Constitution.

5.

United States Reports.
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6.

Supreme Court Reporter.

7.

Federal Supplement.

Education and Law;

A Growing Concern

Since the case of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 347 U.S.
4B3 (1954), there has been a marked increase in the number of court
decisions involving education; and there is no reason to expect that
judicial and legislative intervention in the educational enterprise will
diminish in the near future.

McCarthy (1976) claimed that since the

mid-1950’s the
legislatures and courts have reshaped public educational policy.
The increasing public awareness of the role of law in all aspects
of society and the growing complexity of the educational enterprise
have catapulted teachers into litigation to an unprecedented degree.
As this trend shows no signs of diminishing in the near future,
teachers need to become more intelligent about the legal facets of
their jobs. (p. 9)
The potential for litigation is a reality with which educators of
today must be prepared to cope.
factors.

This potential stems from several

First, the public has become more litigation-minded.

It is

not at all uncoumon for aggrieved individuals to seek relief in the
judicial system.

Whereas, at.one time in our nation's history, there

was a reluctance to pursue litigation, that reluctance appears to have
significantly diminished.
Secondly, the fact that such a large number of individuals are
involved in the educational process increases the potential for legal
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difficulties.

When one considers that nearly 45 million students are

being taught by approximately 2.5 million teachers who are under the
direction of 175,000 administrators and supervisors and employed by over
100,000 school board members, it becomes evident that the possibility for
a large number of lawsuits exists.
A third factor in the ever-increasing potential for litigation is
that essentially every educational decision seems to contain a
legal ingredient.

Decisions involving corporal punishment, searching

students' lockers, dismissing teachers, negotiating teachers' contracts,
placing nativity scenes on school grounds, and a myriad of other such
decisions all must be weighed against the legal ingredient.
In discussing the need for educators to be informed about legal
matters pertinent to education Leipold and Rousch (1964) said, "All
school persons— school board members, superintendents, principals,
teachers, janitors, bus drivers, students— are all directly concerned.
Yet the sum total of knowledge of this subject among these groups is
limited" (p.i).
Nolte (1978) offered three reasons educators need to be informed
about the legal aspects of teaching.

He said that (a) teachers are

involved in an increasing number of lawsuits, (b) the typical teacher
preparation program does not adequately provide information about legal
rights and liabilities, and (c) the court system has dramatically changed
the teaching profession by virtue of its decisions, especially in
matters pertaining to students' rights.
Hazard, Freeman, Eisdorfer, and Tractenberg (1977) pointed out that
in recent decades the judicial and legislative branches have increased
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their involvement in the schooling process.

In describing the

proliferation of judicial interventions into the field of education
Hazard et al. (1977) stated that
what once may have been professional decisions now tend to be
judicial decisions*

The traditional judicial reluctance to move

into the substance and processes of school operations has evolved
into a more aggressive posture reflecting the courts' concern for
basic constitutional rights of teachers and pupils, (p. 2)
In the introduction of their book Gatti and Gatti (1972) stated
that "there are many legal problems with which an educator must deal . . . .
And there will be more" (p. 9).

These two facts of educational life have

created a growing concern among teacher educators about the need to make
those pursuing careers in education more knowledgeable of their legal
rights and responsibilities.
Hazard et al. (1977) noted that the law makes its presence felt at
every level of the public school enterprise.

"Board members,

administrators, supervisors, teachers, student teachers, and other
preservice professionals of all kinds work daily in a setting bound by the
constraints and duties imposed by court rulings, statutory mandates, and
agency prescriptions" (p. 3).

A working knowledge of the parameters of

these rulings, mandates and prescriptions thus becomes of paramount
importance to educators who are expected to carry them out.
Hazard et al. (1977) further cautioned:
The traditional notion that schools offered their wares to pupils
and parents on a take-it-or-leave-it basis is no longer tenable.
The clients of schooling have turned to the law for both a sword
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and a shield.

Decisions by school boards, administrators, and

teachers are challenged by pupils and other school clients.

As

these challenges escalate into lawsuits and legislation, the
traditional relationships among the parties change.

Parents seem

less willing to accept school decisions about their children; pupils
are less inclined to accept the school regimen as the gospel.

This

growing skepticism and articulate challenge to school policies and
practices is healthy; our increasing reliance on the law to "cure"
educational ailments may not be.
Teachers play a sensitive role in schooling and should be well
informed about their rights, dutieB, and liabilities and those of
the pupils.
high.

The price of ignorance about the law is frightfully

Aside from the economic cost of school lawsuits, the hostility

and alienation generated in them interfere with effective schooling.
As a seedbed for young minds, the schools surely should be one social
institution in which law, fairness, and equity prevail, (p. 6)
With the increase of legislative and judicial intervention into the
educational enterprise there have been and will continue to be a number
of significant changes in educational policy, procedures, and practices.
Hazard et al. (1977) concluded;
The preparation of professional personnel, the teacher/learner
relationships, the structures and procedures of schooling are
increasingly affected by the courts, the legislatures, and
government agencies at the state and federal levels.

Teachers and

administrators confront the law in their professional roles and
need to understand the implications and consequences of legal and
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legislative mandates on the pupils and themselves, (p. 56)
Thus, the literature supports the notion that there is growing
concern that those involved in educating our nation's youth need to
become more knowledgeable of their legal rights and responsibilities.
As the judicial and legislative branches expand their intervention in the
schooling process, the awareness and knowledge of legal issues possessed
by educators need to expand accordingly.
been the case.

Unfortunately, this has not

Many writers in the area of school law have expressed

the belief that the preparation programs for educators are not adequately
informing teachers of their legal rights, duties, and responsibilities.
McCarthy (1976) concluded that
there is little justification for institutions of higher education
to graduate aspiring teachers without offering them some formal
exposure to legal principles affecting their jobs.

Presently

teachers can even receive advanced degrees from most institutions
* . . and never take a course in school law.

This posture destines

educators to have reform measures thrust upon them by outside
forces.

Therefore, a crucial need exists to reevaluate teacher

preparation programs and ensure that they incorporate the legal
issues that have become an integral part of the teacher's role
today, (p. 5)
Van Geel (Simpson, 1975) expressed that, while it was not the intent
of colleges of education to transform education students into lawyers,
increased exposure to matters of law impacting on the educational process
could increase educators' awareness of and help them more effectively
deal with some of the legal issues involved in education.

Simpson was

15
more forceful in his discussion of the same topic.

He claimed that it is

Ha case of institutional negligence to let any person go out and become a
teacher or administrator without some fundamental knowledge of law"
(Simpson, 1975, p. 42).
Hazard et al. (1977) cautioned against the folly of assuming that
well-intended, professional-minded school personnel will be able to avoid
litigation.

"Their awareness of the legal implications of their work is

inportant both to their professional role and to the pupils and parents
they serve" (p. 3).
Following a discussion of the evolution of the intervention of the
courts into the realm of schools and schooling, Campbell, Cunningham,
Nystrand, and Usdan (1975) concluded that the courts' involvement in areas
pertinent to school governance will continue to grow.

In light of this

growing involvement educators need to find more efficient means of
becoming and remaining knowledgeable of legal implications for education.
In calling for the inclusion of instruction in the area of school
law in teacher preparation programs. Hazard et al. (1977) emphasized:
Professional preparation programs generally do not adequately
inform teachers, administrators, and specialists on matters of
law; the concentration on pedagogy and academic content overlooks
the impact of legislation and the legal consequences inpinging on
the school's mission . . . .

Schools are, indeed, creatures of

law; and to the extent school professionals are not informed of
their legal rights, duties, and responsibilities, the schooling
process is vulnerable to intervention by the courts.

Preservice

preparation of educational personnel must include appropriate
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instruction in significant legal concepts so that the proper
relations among the law, teachers, pupils, and schooling can be
respected and turned to the benefit of both producers and
consumers, (p. 56)

The Supreme Court and Education
The Constitution of the United States does not specifically address
the topic of schools or education.

Therefore, by virtue of the Tenth

Amendment, education is generally considered a function of the states.
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people" (United States Constitution, Amendment Ten).

Although

education is a state function, a state's school code and local school
policies, procedures, and practices must comply with the constitution.
In those instances in which they do not, the likelihood of litigation
increases.
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution of the United States
established the Supreme Court and provided for the creation of other
courts by acts of Congress.

"The judicial Power of the United States,

shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish" (United States
Constitution, Article III, Section 1).
Generally speaking, the Supreme Court refrains from hearing a case
unless a substantial federal issue is involved.

"The issues in such

cases touch upon rights guaranteed by the federal constitution or
affected by federal legislation" (Hazard, 1978, p. 8).

Nonetheless, the

17
Supreme Court has decided a number of education cases in recent years.
Reutter (1982) offered a reason for the burgeoning of Supreme Court
intervention in education matters:

"Partly, this has been a reflection

of the post-Wbrld War II accent on civil rights and liberties" (p. 2).
Hazard et al. (1977) noted that federal judicial involvement in
education is usually based on one of two constitutional principles,
(a) the "general welfare" clause (Article I, section 8 of the
United States Constitution), which Authorizes congressional action
on behalf of the people, and (b) the protection of citizens under
the federal constitution, particularly the First, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments, (p. 6)
Five areas of Supreme Court decisions affecting education have been
identified.

Below is a brief^examination of the landmark Supreme Court

decisions in each of these areas.

The five areas discussed are:

(a) student rights and responsibilities; (b) employee rights and
responsibilities; (c) church and state relationships; (d) race, language,
and sex discrimination; and (e) school district finance and organization.

Student Rights and Responsibilities
Historically, education in the United States has operated under the
doctrine of in loco parentis.

Authority delegated to school officials

through this doctrine has allowed school officials to make, enforce, and
interpret the rules of school governance without interference or
intervention by the courts.

Presumably, if school officials acted os a

reasonable parent would act in a givon situation, then their actions were
beyond judicial control (Ringenberger, 1901).

Zirkel (1978b) explains the earlier reluctance of the United States
Supreme Court to interfere in school matters related to the rights and
responsibilities of students as being "the strong belief of the
judiciary in the American tradition of local control over the schools"
(p. 32).

Even as recently as 1968 the Court stated that "public

education in our nation is conmitted to the control of state and local
authorities.

Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of

conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems" (Epperson
V. Arkansas. 393 U.S. 104, 1968).
Since 1943, however, the courts have been giving increased
attention to the rights of children versus those of state and local
governments and their agents. .The court system's re-examination of the
doctrine of in loco parentis led to an emerging interest in protecting
fundamental rights against government encroachment.

Although the

principle of in loco parentis remains, it has undergone considerable
transformation in its application in recent years.
The framers of the United States Constitution considered individual
rights so central that the Constitution had to be amended ten times
before it could be ratified by the states.

These ten amendments, known

collectively as the Bill of Rights, were intended to protect citizens'
fundamental liberties from intervention and interference by government
authorities (Ringenberger, 1981).

In the case of In re Gault (1967),

the United States Supreme Court held that these constitutional guarantees
applied not only to adults, but to juveniles as well.

Jacobson v. Massachusetts 197 U.S. 11 (1905).

Two of the earliest

United States Supreme Court decisions affecting education in matters
relating to student rights and responsibilities involved the issue of
mandatory vaccination.

In Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905), the

defendant claimed that the Massachusetts statute authorizing local boards
of health to institute compulsory vaccination programs denied him his
liberty as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Supreme Court

recognized the authority of the state to enact such a statute, referring
to it as a "police power" of the state.

"According to settled

principles," the United States Supreme Court opinion reads, "the police
power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable
regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will protect
the public health and public safety" (JacobBon v. Massachusetts, 25 S.Ct.
361, 1905).

The Supreme Court held that a law mandating compulsory

vaccination in order to protect the public health and that doeB not
require the participation of those whose health does not permit such
vaccination is constitutional.

In the words of Mr. Justice Harlan,

"Whatever may be thought of the expediency of this statute, it cannot be
affirmed to be, beyond question, in palpable conflict with the
Constitution" (Jacobson v. Massachusetts. 25 S.Ct. 363, 1905).

Zucht v. King. 260 U.S. 174 (1922).

Citing the Jacobson decision as

precedent, the Court declared, in Zuoht v. King (1922), that it is within
the police power of a state to enact a statute providing for compulsory
vaccination.

In Zucht. a student challenged a city ordinance that

provided that no individual could attend a public school or other place
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of education without first having presented a certificate of vaccination.
It was the student's contention that such an ordinance was a violation of
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court concluded that such a law is indeed constitutional:
City ordinances making vaccination a condition to attendance at
public or private schools and vesting broad discretion in health
authorities to determine when and under what circumstances the
requirement shall be enforced are consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment and, in view of prior decisions, a contrary contention
presents no substantial constitutional question. (Zucht v. King.
260 U.S. 174, 1922)

Mlnersvllle School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 5fl6 (1940).

In 1940

the United States Supreme Court concluded that a regulation requiring
students and teachers to salute and pledge allegiance to the American
flag was constitutional, even if to do so violated an individual's
religious convictions.
A state regulation requiring that pupils in the public schools, on
pain of expulsion, participate in a daily ceremony of saluting the
national flag, whilst reciting in unison a pledge of allegiance to
it . . .

held within the scope of legislative power, and

consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .

(Minersville School

District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 1940)
In the Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940) opinion,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter made two statements which reflect the deference
that the Court gave to local control of education.

First. N . . . the
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courtroom is not the arena for debating issues of educational policy"
(Minersville School District v. Gobitis. 310 U.S. 586, 1940).

And,

It is not our province to choose among competing considerations in
the subtle process of securing effective loyalty to the traditional
ideals of democracy, while respecting at the same time individual
idioayncracies among a people so diversified in racial origins and
religious allegiances.
board for the country,

So to hold would in effect make us the school
(Minersville School District v. Gobitis,

310, U.S. 586, 1940)

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).

These two remarks are of significance because only three years

later in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnett (1943), the
Court reversed its earlier decision, holding that compulsory flag
salute programs violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Mr. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the court:
We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag
salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their
power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is
the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve
from all official control. (West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 642, 1943)
The protection secured by the First Amendment includes the protection of
expressions of political opinion and symbolic speech.

The refusal to

participate in a flag salute and pledge program is such an expression
within the meaning of this Amendment.
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Addressing the question of whether compulsory flag salute and pledge
programs violate Fourteenth Amendment guarantees Mr. Justice Jackson
concluded:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the
citizens against the State itself and all of its creatures— Boards
of Education not excepted.

These have, of course, important,

delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may
not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. (West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 637, 1943)
The Fourteenth Amendment protects citizens from denial of First
Amendment rights absent a "present and substantial danger which the state
may lawfully protect.

The mere passive refusal to salute the flag does

not create a danger to the state such that the First Amendment rights to
belief and expression may be impaired" (Zirkel, 1978b, p. 37).

Taylor v. Mississippi. 319 U.S. 583 (1943).

In a related case,

Taylor v. Mississippi (1943), the Court ruled that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits a state statute that provides for the punishment of
individuals who, for religious reasons, urge and advise citizens to cease
saluting national and state flags.

Mr. Justice Roberts delivered the

opinion:
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943)
. . . the court has decided that a state may not enforce a regulation
requiring children in the public schools to salute the national
emblem.

The statute here in question seeks to punish as a criminal

one who teaches resistance to government compulsion to salute.

If
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the Fourteenth Amendment bans enforcement of the school regulation,
a fortiori it prohibits the imposition of punishment for urging and
advising that, on religious grounds, citizens refrain from saluting
the flag. (Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 588, 589, 1943)

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).

Although not originating in a school

setting, In re Gault (1967) is regarded as a landmark decision in
Supreme Court decisions affecting education.

The Gault decision is often

considered the turning point in the Court's interpretation of the
applicability of constitutional safeguards to minors.

The Gault opinion

clearly recognized that children are "persons” and are entitled to
protection of constitutional liberties.

Mr. Justice Fortas stated that

"neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone" (In re Gault, 387 U.S. 13, 1967)•
Because fifteen-year old Gerald Gault was denied procedural due
process during his juvenile court proceedings, he challenged the
constitutionality of the state juvenile court statute.

In deciding in

favor of Gault, the Supreme Court determined that, when faced with a
potential loss of liberty, even a minor is entitled to the procedural
safeguards afforded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

If a minor's rights are to be abridged or taken away, he

must be provided the following constitutional safeguards of due process;
1.

A

2. A

notice of charges.
notice of right to legal counsel.

3.

The right of confrontation and cross-examination of complainant.

4.

A

notice of privilege against self-incrimination.
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5.

Access to sworn testimony from complainant and witnesses.

6.

Access to a transcript of proceedings.

7.

The right of appellate review.

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Coranunity School District. 393 U.S.
503 (1969).

In addition to the protection of procedural due process, the

Supreme Court has determined that minors also are guaranteed their First
Amendment right of freedom of speech.

In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent

Community School District (1969). the Court declared it unconstitutional
to suspend students for the peaceful wearing of arm bands as an expression
of symbolic speech unless it can be shown that interference with the
educational process did or would occur.

The conduct of the students

involved in this silent protest of American involvement in Vietnam was
found to be within the protection of the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

"A

prohibition against expression of opinion, without any evidence that
the rule is necessary to avoid substantial interference with school
discipline or the rights of others, is not permissible under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments" (Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District. 393 U.S. 503, 1969).
The Court concluded that the students' exercise of their First
Amendment rights collided with the school authorities' prohibition of
the wearing of armbands.

The Court explained that the mere

anticipation or apprehension of a disturbance did not supersede the
students' right of expression.
majority, said:

Mr. Justice Fortas, speaking for the

First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers
and students.

It can hardly be argued that either students or

teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate. (Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Coircnunlty School District, 393 U.S. 506, 1969)
The District Court had dismissed the complaint in the Tinker case,
upholding "the constitutionality of the school authorities' action on the
ground that it was reasonable in order to prevent disturbance of school
discipline" (Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Cornnunity School District,
393 U.S. 505, 1969).
decision.
decisions.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's

Thus, the United States Supreme Court overruled the two lower
Mr. Justice Black, in his dissenting remarks, concluded:

I wish, therefore, wholly to disclaim any purpose on my part to hold
that the Federal Constitution compels the teachers, parents, and
elected school officials to surrender control of the American public
school system to public school students.

I dissent. (Tinker v .

Des Moines Independent Comwunitv School District. 393 U.S. 526, 1969)

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).

The Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution requires that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

In recent years

the Court has attempted to ascertain whether these due process procedures
were applicable to the education environment.

The judgment rendered in

Goss v. Lopez (1975) was that suspensions ordered and statutes permitting
suspensions, absent provisions for notice and a hearing, are
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unconstitutional.

By a five-to-four margin the Supreme Court ruled that

students facing suspensions of ten days or less have "property" and
"liberty" interests that qualify for protection under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although there is no provision in the United States Constitution
for free public education, the fact that a state has undertaken to
provide its children with such an education creates a constitutionally
protected property interest.

Since education is a constitutionally

protected property interest, a student's education cannot be denied
because of misconduct without adherence to the minimum procedures
required by due process.

Speaking for the majority Mr. Justice White

wrote:
The authority possessed by the State to prescribe and enforce
standards of conduct in its schools although concededly very
broad, must be exercised consistently with constitutional safeguards.
Among other things, the State is constrained to recognize a student's
legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest
which is protected by the Due Process Clause and which may not be
taken away for misconduct without adherence to the minimum procedures
required by that Clause. {Goss v. Lopez. 419 U.S. 574, 1975)
The Due Process Clause's prohibition against arbitrary deprivation
of a liberty interest is applicable in the Goss case, too.

The Supreme

Court concluded that students have a "liberty" interest in their
reputation as well as their future educational and employment
opportunities.

"The State's claimed right to determine unilaterally and

without process whether that misconduct has occurred immediately collides
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with the Due Process Clause's prohibition against arbitrary deprivation
of liberty" tGos3 v. Lopez. 419 U.S. 565/ 1975).

"Where a person's good

namer reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the
government is doing to him, the minimal requirements of the Clause must
be satisfied" tGoss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 574, 1975).
The Court emphasized that they thought that in school suspensions
only minimal procedures of due process were required.

They stopped short

of requiring school authorities to afford students the opportunity to
secure counsel, to confront and cross-examine complainants, or to call
witnesses on their own behalf (Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 583, 1975).

The

Court held that students to be suspended for up to ten days must be
accorded the following due process procedures prior to the suspension:
(1) oral or written notice of the charges; (2) an explanation of the
evidence the authorities have; and (3) a hearing, at which time the
student is allowed to present his or her version of the misconduct in
question.
There need be no delay between the time "notice" is given and the
time of the hearing.

In the great majority of cases the

disciplinarian may informally discuss the alleged misconduct with
the student minutes after it has occurred.

We hold only that, in

being given an opportunity to explain his version of the facts at
this discussion, the student first be told what he is accused of
doing and what the basis of the accusation is. (Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 582, 1975)
The decision of the Court in Goss further provided that if a
student's continued presence at the school endangers persons, or property.
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or threatens to disrupt the academic process, suspension could precede
the required procedures.

If immediate removal from the school is

necessary, the notice and hearing should follow within a reasonable
time.

Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).

Since 1871 individuals

who contend that their civil rights have been violated by an agent of
the state have had a right to seek redress in the judicial system under
a statute known as Section 1983.

Over a century later, in Wood v.

Strickland (1975), the Supreme Court addressed the question of personal
liability of school administrators and school board members for violation
of students' rights in a case involving the expulsion of three students
for "spiking" the punch at an extracurricular meeting held at the school.
On the basis of common-1aw tradition and public policy, the Court
held that school officials are entitled to qualified immunity from
liability for damages under Section 1983.
dependent upon two elements of good faith.

This qualified immunity is
First, to retain inmunity

from liability, school officials must act without "the malicious intention
to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the
student" (Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 322, 1975).

Secondly, a school

official is "not immune from liability for damages under Section 1983 if
he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his
sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights
of the student affected . .

(Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 322, 1975).

Any action "with such an impermissible motivation or with such disregard
of the student's clearly established constitutional rights . . . cannot
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reasonably be characterized as being in good faith" (Wood v. Strickland.
420 U.S. 322, 1975) and hence is denied immunity.

If school officials

violate a student's constitutional rights, whether through ignorance or
through disregard for the law, they forfeit their immunity and are liable.
Mr. Justice White, writing the majority opinion, stated the need for
granting this qualified immunity;
We think there must be a degree of immunity if the work of the
schools is to go forward; and however worded, the immunity must be
such that public school officials understand that action taken in
the good-faith fulfillment of their responsibilities and within the
bounds of reason under all the circumstances will not be punished
and that they need not exercise their discretion with undue timidity.
(Wood v. Strickland. 420 U.S. 321, 1975)
To deny any measure of immunity to school officials would have subjected
the decision-making process to intimidation.

Baker V. Owen. 39S F. Supp. 294 (1975).

In recent years, courts at

various levels have been called upon to consider the constitutionality of
statutes empowering school officials to employ corporal punishment.

In

Baker v. Owen (1975), respondents claimed that a Worth Carolina statute
empowering school authorities to “use reasonable force in the exercise of
lawful authority to restrain or correct pupils and to maintain order"
(Worth Carolina; General Statutes Sections 115-146) was unconstitutional
on two counts.

It was argued that the administration of corporal

punishment violated a student's Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest
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(discussed above under Goss v. Lopez) and his or her Eighth Amendment
protection from cruel and unusual punishment.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the District
Court, upholding the use of corporal punishment in the schools.

The

District Court claimed that although there is a Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interest in parents' control of their children, the state has a
countervailing interest in maintaining order in the schools, including
the freedom to use corporal punishment as a means of maintaining that
order.

However, because of that Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest,

in administering corporal punishment school officials must accord students
with minimal due process procedures.

These procedures include the

following protections:
(1) Except for those acts of misconduct which are so antisocial or
disruptive in nature as to shock the conscience, corporal punishment
may never be used unless student is informed beforehand that specific
misbehavior will occasion its use and, subject to some exception, it
should never be employed as first line of punishment for misbehavior,
but should be used only after attempt has been made to modify behavior
by some other means. (Baker v. Owen. 395 F. Supp. 295, 1975)
(2) “Teacher or principal must punish corporally in presence of second
school official, who must be informed beforehand and in student's presence
of reason for punishment . . . "

(Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 295, 1975).

(3) “School official who has administered corporal punishment to student
must provide child's parent, upon request, written explanation of his
reasons and name of second official who was present” (Baker v. Owen, 395
F. Supp. 295, 1975).
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The District Court held that the administration of corporal
punishment to the student in question in this case did not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment.

Therefore, the respondents1 claim that the

student's Eighth Amendment rights were violated was denied.

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).

In the emotionally-charged

case of Ingraham v. Wright (1977), two Florida junior high school students
alleged that they and other students had been subjected to corporal
punishment in violation of their constitutional rights.

Two questions

concerning the use of corporal punishment in public schools were presented:
(1) Does the implementation of corporal punishment, as a means of
maintaining discipline in the schools, constitute cruel and unusual
punishment as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment? and, (2) Does the
practice of corporally punishing students require prior notice and hearing
to comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Even though the evidence showed that the paddlings given to the two
students were exceptionally harsh, the Supreme Court concluded that the
Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause i*3 inapplicable to
disciplinary corporal punishment in schools.'

The opinion of the Court,

written by Mr. Justice Powell stated:
An examination of the history of the (Eighth) Amendment and the
decisions of this Court construing the proscription against cruel
and unusual punishment confirms that it was designed to protect those
convicted of crimes.

He adhere to this long-standing limitation

and hold that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to the paddling of
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children

ab

a means of maintaining discipline in public schools.

(Ingraham v. Wright. 430 U.S. 664, 1977)
In their examination of the question regarding the applicability of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that
that clause does not require notice and hearing prior to inflicting
corporal punishment.

Minimal due process procedures were determined to

be sufficient safeguards.

While recognizing that corporal punishment in

the public schools does involve a student's liberty interest, the Court
concluded that "the Due Process Clause does not require notice and a
hearing prior.to the imposition of corporal punishment in the public
schools, as that practice is authorized and limited by the common law"
(Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 682, 1977).
While denying the applicability of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments in this case, the Court pointed out that students are
protected against excessive or unjustified corporal punishment by the
opportunity to file civil or criminal complaints against school officials.
"To the extent that the force is excessive or unreasonable, the educator
in virtually all States is subject to possible civil and criminal
liability" (Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 661, 1977).
In those cases where severe punishment is contemplated, the
available civil and criminal sanctions for abuse . . . afford
significant protection against unjustified corporal punishment.
Teachers and school authorities are unlikely to inflict corporal
punishment unnecessarily or excessively when a possible consequence
of doing so is the institution of civil or criminal proceedings
against them. (Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 678, 1977)
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Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the four dissenting
justices in Ingraham v. Wright (1977), and argued that the Eighth
Amendment should apply to students because to mile otherwise is to afford
criminals greater constitutional safeguards than those granted to
misbehaving juveniles.
inflicted on the two
is

If a criminal were to receive the punishment
junior high students in question in this case there

little doubt that the Eighth Amendment would have been deemed

applicable.

Mr. Justice White offered the following observations

regarding the majority's opinion:
By holding that

the Eighth Amendment protects only criminals, the

majority adopts

the view that one is entitled to the protections

afforded by the Eighth Amendment only if he is punished for acts
that are sufficiently opprobrious for society to make them "criminal".
(Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 691, 1977)
In response to the opinion of the majority that students were
adequately protected against excessive corporal punishment or denial of
due process because they have opportunity to pursue civil and criminal
action against school authorities, Mr. Justice White said:
The majority's conclusion that a damages remedy for excessive
corporal punishment affords adequate process rests on the novel
theory that the State may punish an individual without giving him
an opportunity to present his side of the story, as long as he can
later recover damages from a state official if he is innocent.
(Ingraham v. Wright. 430 U.S. 696, 1977)
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Employee Rights and Responsibilities
Like all other citizens, school employees receive the protections
granted by the United States Constitution.

Of particular significance

are the individual rights protected by the first ten amendments to the
Constitution.

Teachers, like students, do not shed their constitutional

rights at the schoolhouse gate.
Although all United States citizens are guaranteed certain rights,
these rights are seldom viewed by the courts as absolutes.

In any

consideration of constitutional rights a proper “balance" is sought.
Zirkel (1978b) savs that the Supreme Court "will continue to wrestle
with the balance between the employee's individual right and the
interest of the educational establishment as represented through the
state" (p. 48).

In cases involving employee rights,

whether the rights of a teacher will be held to be constitutionally
protected will depend in part on the weight given the teacher's
expressed right, as against the reasonableness of state action needed
to operate and manage the schools efficiently and effectively.
(Zirkel, 1978b, p. 47)
Hoite (1978) stated that the student's right to learn is broader and
deeper than the teacher’s right to teach.

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

In Meyer v. Nebraska (1923),

the Supreme Court ruled that a state law which prohibited the teaching of
a modern foreign language to a student who had not yet completed the
eighth grade was unconstitutional.

The Court determined that such an

action by the state was an invasion of the guarantees of the Fourteenth
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Amendment.

The Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from arbitrary

or unreasonable state action impairing life, liberty, or property
interests.
In overturning the decision of the Supreme Court of ttie State of
Nebraska, the United States Supreme Court ruled that such a law prohibiting
the teaching of a foreign language to students in kindergarten through
eighth grade exceeded the power of the state.

The Court held that

the right to choose and pursue a given legitimate vocation is within
the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .

Inparting

knowledge in a foreign language is not inherently imnoral or inimical
to the public welfare, and not a legitimate subject for prohibitory
legislation. (Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 391, 1923)
Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the Court and
concluded:
The desire of the legislature to foster a homogeneous people with
American ideals prepared readily to understand current discussions
of civic matters is easy to appreciate . . . .

But the means adopted,

we think, exceed the limitations upon the power of the State and
conflict with rights assured to plaintiff in error. (Meyer v.
Nebraska. 262 U.S. 402, 1923)

Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York. 342 U.S. 485
(1952).

The question of the constitutionality of loyalty oaths has been

the subject of extensive review by the Court.

More than a dozen loyalty

oath decisions were handed down by the Supreme Court in the twenty years
between 1952 and 1971.

36
The Court . . . has formulated a doctrine that will strike down as
unconstitutional for vagueness any loyalty oath which is unclear
and/or difficult for an employee to determine what conduct is covered
by the law and what may be regarded as violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment. (Zirkel, 1978b, pp. 47-48)
One of the earliest loyalty oath decisions was Adler v. Board of
Education of the City

of New

York (1952). In this case, the Court upheld

the constitutionality

of the

Hew York City

question.

Civil Service statute in

The statute made "ineligible for employment in any public

school any member of any organization advocating the overthrow of the
Government by force, violence or unlawful means" (Adler v. Board of
Education of the City of New York, 342 U.S. 485, 1952).

The law further

required the Board of Regents
(1) to adopt and enforce rules for the removal of any employee who
violates or is ineligible . . .

(2) to promulgate a list of

(proscribed) organizations . . . and (3) to provide in Its rules
that membership in any organization so listed is prima facie evidence
of disqualification
organization may

for employment in the public schools.

be so listed, and no

No

person severed from or denied

employment, except after a hearing and subject to judicial review.
(Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 342 U.S. 485,
1952)
Because of the specific provisions of the New York City Civil Service
statute, the Court decreed that the void-for-vagueness policy need not be
applied in this case.

Because the law penalized only knowing membership
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and because it provided £or a hearing prior to disqualification, it was
found to be within the bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.

Wleman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).

The Adler decision was the

exception rather than the rule, for-in most other cases the Supreme Court
ruled loyalty oaths unconstitutional.

In Wleman v. Updegraff (1952), the

Supreme Court declared an Oklahoma state employees' loyalty oath
unconstitutional because it conditioned state employment on the taking of
a loyalty oath based on innocent, as well as knowing, membership in a
subversive organization.

The Oklahoma loyalty oath excluded individuals

from state employment "solely on the basis of membership in such
organizations, regardless of their knowledge concerning the activities
and purposes of the organizations to which they had belonged" (Wleman v .
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 1B3, 1952).
The Court's decision in Wleman was based on the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
To be valid under this clause, a statute must require that those to
be penalized have actual knowledge of which organizations are banned
and of the actual proscribed purpose of any organization to which
they may belong . . . .

The Court assumes that the oath penalizes

innocent as well as knowing membership . . . .

The Court also finds

the statute to be an impermissible interference with the First
Amendment freedom of association. (Zirkel, 1978b, p. 53)

Shelton v. Tucker. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).

An Arkansas law required

each teacher in state-supported schools to file an annual affidavit
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listing every organization to which he or she had belonged or regularly
contributed within the preceding five years.

Teachers in the state-

supported schools had no tenure and were not covered by a civil service
system.

The statute thus required Arkansas teachers to disclose

information to those who could fire them at the end of any given school
year, without notice of the reasons for dismissal or an opportunity for
a hearing prior to dismissal.

The Supreme Court ruled that the Arkansas

statute was invalid because it deprived teachers of their right of
associational freedom.
While not denying that the state of Arkansas has a right to
investigate the fitness and competence of its teachers, the broad sweep
of this statute interfered with associations that have no bearing on
teacher fitness, went far beyond what might be a legitimate inquiry,
and unconstitutionally inpaired the teachers1 right of freedom of
association.

"This First Amendment right of freedom of association is

protected from unnecessary or overbroad state interference by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" (Zirkel, 1978b, p. 56).

Cranp v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, 368 U.S.
278 (1961).

A Florida statute required every employee of the state and

its subdivisions to swear in writing that he had never lent his "aid,
support, advice, counsel, or influence to the Communist Party."

The

statute further required the immediate discharge of any employee who
failed to subscribe to such an oath.

A teacher refused to sign the

statement and challenged the statute, claiming that its meaning was so
vague as to deprive him of liberty or property without due process of law.
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In overturning the decision of the Florida Supreme Court, the
United States Supreme Court declared the statute unconstitutional.
The meaning of the required oath is so vague and uncertain that the
State cannot, consistently with the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, force an employee to take such an oath, at the
risk of subsequent prosecution for perjury, or face immediate
dismissal from public service. (Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction
of Prance County, 368 U.S. 278, 1961)
Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Courtt
We think that this case demonstrably falls within the compass of
those decisions of the Court which hold that 11 . . .

a statute which

either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of conmon intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law" . . . .

The vice of unconstitutional vagueness is

further aggravated where, as here, the statute in question operates
to Inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively
protected by the Constitution.

(Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction

of Orange County, 368 U.S. 287, 1961)

Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).

This class action, brought

by members of the faculty, staff, and student body of the University of
Washington, sought judgment on the constitutionality of two state statutes
requiring the taking of oaths as a condition of employment by the state.
A 1931 statute required teachers to swear, by precept and example, to
promote respect for the flag and the institutions of the United States and
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the State of Washington, reverence for law and order, and undivided
allegiance to the Government of the United States.

A 1955 statute

required each state employee to swear that he or she was not a
subversive person:

that he does not commit, or advise, teach, abet,

or advocate another to commit or aid in the commission of any act
intended to overthrow or alter, or assist in the overthrow or
alteration, of the constitutional form of government by revolution,
force, or violence. (Baggett v. Bullitt. 377 U.S. 360, 1964)
Citing the Cramp decision, the Court held that the provisions of the
two statutes violated due process since the oaths were unduly vague,
uncertain, and broad.
A State cannot require an employee to take an unduly vague oath
containing a promise of future conduct at the risk of prosecution
for perjury or loss of employment, particularly where the exercise
of First Amendment freedoms may thereby be deterred. (Baggett v .
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 1964)

Elfbrandt v. Russell, 364 U.S. 11 (1966).

An Arizona act required

state employees to take an oath to support the Federal and State
Constitutions and state laws.

Under a legislative gloss put on the oath,

an employee was subject to prosecution for perjury and discharge from
office if he "knowingly and willfully" became or remained a member of the
communist party of the United States or its successors or any of its
subordinate organizations or any other organization having as one of its
purposes the overthrow of the government.

This Arizona act was challenged

by a teacher who refused to take the oath claiming that the meaning of the
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oath was unclear and that she could not obtain a hearing In order to have
the meaning determined.
The Supreme Court, In a five-to-four decision, overturned the
decision of the Arizona Supreme Court and declared that a loyalty oath
statute which attaches sanctions to membership without requiring the
"specific intent" to further the illegal aims of the organization is
unconstitutional.
The Court held that political groups may embrace both legal and
illegal aims, and persons may join such groups without embracing the
organization's illegal aims.
Those who join an organization but do not participate in its
unlawful activities surely pose no threat, either as citizens or
as public employees.

Laws such as this which are not restricted

in scope to those who join with the "specific intent" to further
illegal action impose, in effect, a conclusive presumption that the
member shares the unlawful aims of the organization. (Elfbrandt v .
Russell, 384 U.S. 17, 1966)
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a
statute infringing on protected constitutional rights, in this case
freedom of political association, be narrowly drawn to define and
punish specific conduct constituting a clear and present danger to
a substantial interest of the state.

Those who join an organization

without sharing in its unlawful purpose pose no threat to
constitutional government. (Zirkel, 1978b, p. 58)
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Keylshian v. Board of Regents of the University of the State of
Hew York, 385 U.S. 589 (19671.

New York had a complicated network of

teacher loyalty laws and regulations.

The constitutionality of this

network of laws was challenged by a number of faculty members and one
nonfaculty employee of the State University of New York.

The laws under

examination provided for the dismissal of employees of the state
educational system who uttered "treasonable or seditious" words, who
performed "treasonable or seditious" acts, who advocated or participated
in the distribution of written materials supporting violent overthrow of
the government, and who belonged to "subversive" organizations.
The Court, by a five-to-four margin, declared that loyalty oath
statutes which make membership in an organization sufficient grounds
for termination are unconstitutional.

To be valid, a loyalty law must

be limited to knowing, active members who help to pursue the illegal
goals of the subversive organization.

Mr. Justice Brennan, in delivering

the majority opinion, stated that a "crucial consideration is that no
teacher can know just where the line is drawn between 'seditious' and
nonseditious utterances and acts" (Kevishian v. Board of Regents of the
University of the State of Hew York, 385 U.S. 599, 1967).
In his argument that the loyalty laws were unduly vague and broad,
Mr. Justice Brennan further claimed that other provisions of the statutes
suffer from vagueness.

For example, the provision which bars employment

of any person who "by word of mouth or writing wilfully and deliberately
advocates, advises, or teaches the doctrine" of forceful overthrow of
government is "plainly susceptible of sweeping and improper application.
It may well prohibit the employment of one who merely advocates the
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doctrine in the abstract without any attempt to indoctrinate others,
or incite others to action in furtherance of unlawful aims" (Keyishian v.
Board of Regents of the University of the State of Mew York, 385 U.S.
599-600, 1967).
Another subsection of the Hew York statute required the dismissal of
an employee who was involved with the distribution of written material
"containing or advocating, advising or teaching the doctrine" of forceful
overthrow, and who himself “advocates, advises, teaches, or embraces the
duty, necessity, or propriety of adopting the doctrine."

Here again, mere

advocacy of abstract doctrine is apparently included.
In declaring the various laws unconstitutional, the Court concluded
that where "statutes have an overbroad sweep, just

sb

where they are

vague, the hazard of loss or substantial impairment of those precious
rights may be critical . . . "

(Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the

University of the State of Hew York, 385 U.S. 609, 1967).

The opinion

of the Court was based on the First Amendment freedoms of speech and
association and the safeguard of due process of law as guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment.

Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971).

A Florida teacher

m s dismissed for her refusal to sign a loyalty oath which stated:
I do hereby solemnly swear that 1 will support the Constitution of
the United States and of the State of Florida; and that 1 do not
believe in the overthrow of the Government of the United States or
of the State of Florida by force or violence.
The dismissed teacher challenged the constitutionality of both clauses of
the oath.

The Court determined that a loyalty oath conditioning public
employment on the employee's affirmation to BUpport the federal and state
Constitutions is constitutionally valid.

However, that portion of the

oath requiring the employee to swear that he does not believe in the
violent overthrow of the federal or state governments is unconstitutional
where it provides for dismissal without a hearing.

"The second portion

of the oath . . . fallB within the ambit of decisions of this Court
proscribing summary dismissal from public enployment without hearing or
inquiry required by due process . . . .

That portion of the oath,

therefore, cannot stand" (Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 208-209,
1971).

Thus, the statutes' provision for dismissal without a hearing

offends the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Cole v. Richardson (1972), Mr. Chief Justice Burger reviewed the
Court's path through the loyalty oath maze:
He have made clear that neither federal nor state government may
condition employment on taking oaths that impinge on rights
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments respectively, as
for example those relating to political beliefs . . . .

Nor may

employment be conditioned on an oath that one has not engaged, or
will not engage, in protected speech activities such as the following:
criticizing institutions .of government; discussing political doctrine
that approves the overthrow of certain forms of government; and
supporting candidates for political office . . . .

Enployment may

not be conditioned on an oath denying past, or abjuring future,
associational activities within constitutional protection;- such
protected activities include membership in organizations having
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illegal purposes unless one knows of the purpose and shares a
specific intent to promote the illegal purpose . . . .

And, finally,

an oath may not be so vague that "men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
^because such an oathj violates the first essential of due process
of law . . .

Concern for vagueneBS in the oath cases has been

especially great because uncertainty as to an oath's meaning may
deter individuals from engaging in constitutionally protected
activity conceivably within the scope of the oath. (Cole v.
Richardson, 405 U:S. 680-681, 1972)

Slochower V. Board of Higher Education of New York City, 350 O.S.
551 (1956).

Two similar cases with seemingly conflicting decisions

illustrate the delicacy with which the United States Supreme Court makes
its determinations.

Section 903 of the New York City Charter provided

that a city employee who utilized the Fifth Amendment against self
incrimination to avoid answering, before a legislative committee, a
question related to his official conduct, can be discharged from his job.
A professor in a college operated by the city was released, without
notice or hearing, because he refused to answer questions concerning his
membership in the Communist Party.

Under New York law, the teacher was

entitled to tenure and could be dismissed only for cause and after notice,
hearing, and opportunity for appeal.

Since the local board already

possessed the information requested by the legislative committee, “ it
cannot be claimed that the Board's action in dismissing the teacher was
part of a bona fide attempt to gain needed and relevant information
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regarding his qualifications for his position" (Slochower v. Board of
Higher Education of New York City, 350 U.S. 551# 1956).

The Court thus

held that the board's action in dismissing a teacher because of his
refusal to answer questions irrelevant to an inquiry into his fitness to
teach and without a hearing was unconstitutional.

Bellan v. Board of Public Education. School District of Philadelphia.
357 U.S. 399 (1958).

In Beilan v. Board of Public Education (1958), a

similar circumstance eventuated in a different decision from the Court.
Beilan, a Philadelphia public school teacher, refused to answer his
superintendent's questions relating to his Coiranunistic affiliations and
activities.

The teacher refused to answer even after being warned that

the inquiry related to his fitness to teach and that refusal to answer
might lead to his dismissal.

After a hearing, the Board of Education

found that Beilan's refusal to answer the superintendent's questions
constituted "incompetency", grounds for discharge under the state tenure
law, and discharged him.

The teacher claimed that the board's action

was unconstitutional.
The Court held that in this case the board of education's discharge
of a teacher for failure to answer his superintendent's inquiry concerning
his fitness to teach was constitutional.
The questions petitioner (Beilan) refused to answer were relevant to
his fitness and suitability as a teacher, and his discharge was based
upon his insubordination and lack of frankness and candor in refusing
to answer such questions— not upon disloyalty or any of the activities
inquired about . . . .

The State Supreme Court held that

"incompetency," within the meaning of the relevant state statute,
includes petitioner's "deliberate and insubordinate refusal to
answer the questions of his administrative superior in a vitally
important matter pertaining to his fitness," and this interpretation
is not inconsistent with the Federal Constitution. (Beilan v. Board
of Public Education. School District of Philadelphia, 357 U.S.
399-400, 1958)
The essential difference between the Slochower decision and the
Beilan decision was the nature of the inquiry.

In Slochower’s case the

questions were not viewed by the Court as related to his fitness to teach;
in Beilan*s case the questioning superintendent explicitly and
consistently warned the teacher that his inquiry was to determine Beilan*s
fitness to teach.

Pickerino v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205.
Will County, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).

The board of education dismissed a

teacher for writing and publishing in a newspaper a letter criticizing the
board's allocation of school funds between educational and athletic
programs and the board's methods of informing, or preventing the informing
of, the school district's taxpayers of the real reasons additional tax
revenues were being sought.

At a hearing, the board charged that

numerous statements in the letter were false and that publication of the
letter was "detrimental to the efficient operation and administration of
the schools of the district" and that "the interests of the school
required" Pickering's dismissal.

The dismissed teacher claimed that the

letter was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Illinois courts and
ruled that the teacher's dismissal was inproper.

The Court held that

absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by
him/her, a teacher's exercise of his/her right to speak on issues
of public importance, e.g., on the raising and disbursement of
funds for education, may not be the basis of his/her dismissal
from public enployment. (zirkel, 1978b, p. 60)
The teacher's First Amendment right to freedom of expression was
balanced against the State's interest in promoting the efficiency of
its public schools.

Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the

Court:
The public interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters
of public importance— the core value of the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment— is so great that it has been held that a
State cannot authorize the recovery of damages by a public official
for defamatory statements directed at him except when such statements
are shown to have been made either with knowledge of their falsity
or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. (Pickering
v. Board of Education of TownBhip High School District 205, Will
County. 391 U.S. 573, 1968)
In sum, we hold that, in a case such as this, absent proof of false
statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher's
exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may
not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.
(Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205.
Mill County. 391 U.S. 574, 1968)

Those statements of appellant's which were substantially correct
regarded matters of public concern and presented no questions of
faculty discipline or harmony; hence those statements afforded no
proper basis for the Board's action in dismissing appellant . . . .
Appellant's statements which were false likewise concerned issues
then currently the subject of public attention and were neither
shown nor could be presumed to have interfered with appellant's
performance of his teaching duties or the school's general
operation.

They were thus entitled to the same protection as if

they had been made by a member of the general public, and, absent
proof that those false statements were knowingly or recklessly made,
did not justify the Board in dismissing appellant from public
employment. (Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School
District 205, Will County, 391 U.S. 563-564, 1968)

Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).

A 1926 Arkansas statute

prohibited teachers in any state-supported school to teach or use a
textbook that teaches the Darwinian theory of evolution.

In this case,

a Little Rock high school teacher sought declaratory and injunctive relief
challenging the constitutionality of the Arkansas "anti-evolution"
statute.
The Court concluded that a law prohibiting the Darwinian theory of
t

evolution was unconstitutional, conflicting with the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment.

" . . .

the law must be stricken," wrote

Mr. Justice Fortas, "because of its conflict with the constitutional
prohibition of state laws respecting an establishment of religion or
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prohibiting the free exercise thereof" (Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
103, 1968).
The Court also stated that a state's right to prescribe the public
school curriculum did not include the right to prohibit teaching a
particular scientific theory for reasons that run counter to the
principles of the First Amendment.
By and large, public education in our Nation is comnitted to the
control of state and local authorities.

Courts do not and cannot

intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily
operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply
implicate basic constitutional values.

On the other hand,

”[ t > vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere
more vital than in the carmunity of American schools," Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).

As this court said in

Keyishian v. Board of Regents, the First Amendment "does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.”
(Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 104-105, 1968)

Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)
and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).

The interpretation of

tenure laws and dismissal of tenured and nontenured teachers has become
an area of concern in employee rights during recent years.

The

companion cases of Roth and Sindermann illustrate the position of the
Court.

Roth, a nontenured university teacher was notified that he would

not be rehired for the ensuing year.

University rules provided that no

reason need be given for nonretention of a nontenured teacher.

Roth
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claimed deprivation of hia Fourteenth Amendment rights, claiming
infringement of his free speech right (because, he claimed, the true
reason for his nonretention was his criticism of the university
administration), and infringement of his procedural due process right
because of the university’s failure to inform him of the basis for its
decision not to rehlrc him.

The court ruled that

the Fourteenth Amendment does not require opportunity for a hearing
prior to the nonrenewal of a nontenured state teacher's contract,
unless he can show that the nonrenewal deprived him of an interest
in "liberty" or that he had a "property" interest in continued
employment, despite the lack of .tenure or a formal contract.

Here

the nonretention of respondent, absent any charges against him or
stigma or disability foreclosing other employment, is not
tantamount to a deprivation of "liberty," and the terms of
respondent's employment accorded him no "property" interest
protected by procedural due process. (Hoard of Regents of State
Colleges v. Roth, 400 U.S. 564, 1972)
Sindermann had been employed by the Texas college system for ton
years under a series of one-year contracts and was without formal tenure
rights.

After the Board of Regents declined to renew his contract for

the ensuing year, without giving him an explanation or prior hearing,
Sindermann brought action alleging that the decision not to rehire him
was based on his public criticism of the college administration and thus
infringed his free speech right, and that the Regents' failure to afford
him a hearing violated his right to procedural due process.

Although he

had no formal tenure rights, Sindermann claimed do facto tenure based on
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the language of the college's Faculty Guide and on the guidelines
pronulgated for the Texas College and University System.

These guidelines

provide that a teacher with seven years of employment in the system is
tenured and can only be dismissed for cause.
The Court declared that Sindermann's public criticism of his
college's administration was a constitutionally protected right and could
not legitimately be used as the baBis for termination of employment.
This right not to be discharged for constitutionally protected conduct
does not depend on the presence or absence of a contractual or tenure
right to employment.

The First Amendment prohibits state action which

impairs freedom of speech and expression.

A person may not be denied a

governmental benefit because of his exercise of constitutionally
protected rights.
The Court ruled in favor of Sindermann on his claim that the Regents
failed to provide him a hearing prior to his dismissal, thus violating
his right to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Although Sindermann had no formal tenure right, his objective

expectation of reemployment, based on the college's de facto tenure
policy, entitled him to the procedural safeguards of due process before
termination of employment.

Unlike the Roth decision, Sindermann's

objective expectation of tenure creates a "property" interest in continued
employment which is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Conmisslon,
(1976).

A 2 A U.S. 645

After serving the city of Philadelphia as a fireman for sixteen
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years, appellant McCarthy moved his permanent residence from Philadelphia
to Hew Jersey, resulting in the termination of his enployment.

A

Philadelphia municipal ordinance required employees of the city to reside
in Philadelphia.

The fireman challenged the constitutionality of the

ordinance.
The appellant claimed that the Philadelphia ordinance violated his
federally-protected right of interstate travel.

Citing a similar

decision by the Michigan Supreme Court on a similar requirement by the
city of Detroit, the United States Supreme Court held the Philadelphia
ordinance "to be constitutional as a bona fide continuing residence
requirement and not to violate the right of interstate travel of
appellant . . . "

(McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission,

424 U.S. 645, 1976).

Hortonvllle Joint School District Ho. 1 v. Hortonville Education
Association, 426 U.S. 482 (1976).

Prolonged negotiations for renewal of

a collective-bargaining contract between teachers and a Wisconsin school
board failed to produce a contract. 'Under Wisconsin law, the board has
the power to negotiate terms of employment and is the only body empowered
to employ and dismiss teachers.

There is no statute providing for review

of board decisions on such matters.

After repeated unsuccessful efforts

at negotiating a new contract, the teachers went on strike in direct
violation of Wisconsin law.

The board subsequently terminated the

striking teachers' employment, whereupon the teachers brought suit
contending that they had been denied due process of law required by the
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Fourteenth Amendment because they had been discharged by the school board,
a decision-making body that they claimed was not impartial.
The Court concluded that t h e ."Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not guarantee respondent teachers that the decision to
terminate their employment would be made or reviewed 'by a body other than
the School Board" (Bortonvllle Joint' School District No. 1 v. Hortonville
Education Association, 426 U.S. 482, 1976).
Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court:
Our assessment of the interests of the parties in this case leads to
the conclusion that . . . the Board's prior role as negotiator does
not disqualify it to decide that the public interest in maintaining
uninterrupted classroom work required that teachers striking in
violation of state law be discharged. (Hortonville Joint School
District No. 1 v. Hortonville Education Association, 426 U.S. 494,
1976).
In his concluding remarks, Mr. Chief Justice Burger stated:
Respondents have failed to demonstrate that the decision to terminate
their employment was infected by the sort of bias that we have held
to disqualify other decisionmakers as a matter of federal due process.
A showing that the Board was "involved" in the events preceding this
decision, in light of the important interest in leaving with the
Board the power given by the state legislature, is not enough to
overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity in policymakers and
decisionmaking power . . . .

Accordingly, we hold that the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not guarantee
respondents that the decision to terminate their employment would be
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made or reviewed by a body other than the School Board, (Hortonville
Joint School District Ho. 1 v. Hortonville Education Association,
426 U.S. 496-497, 1976)

national League of Cities v. Usery. Secretary of Labor, 426 U.S.
833 (1976).

The original Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 required every

employer "engaged in commerce or in the production of goodB for commerce"
to pay each employee certain minimum wages and overtime pay for work
performed in excess of a specified number of hours.
specifically excluded states as employers.

The original Act

In 1961, the Act's coverage

was extended beyond employees directly connected with interstate commerce
to include all employees of enterprises engaged in commerce or in
production for commerce.

In 1966, the definition of "employer" was

extended to include the state governments with respect to employees of
state hospitals, institutions, and schools.

In Maryland v. Wlrtz (1968),

the United States d eclued the 1961 and 1966 amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act constitutional.

In 1974, the Act was again amended so as

to extend the Act's minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to all
employees of the states and their political subdivisions.

In National

League of Cities v. Usery, Secretary of Labor (1976), a number of cities
and states challenged the validity of the 1974 amendments.
The Court held that the 1974 amendments were not within the
authority granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause.
In attempting to exercise its Commerce Clause power to prescribe
minimum wages and maximum hours to be paid by the States in their
sovereign capacities, Congress has sought to wield its power in a

fashion that would impair the States' “ability to function
effectively in a federal System," . . . and this exercise of
congressional authority does not comport with the federal system
of government embodied in the Constitution.

(National League of

Cities v. Userv. Secretary of Labor. 42S U.S. 833, 1976)
The Court ruled that not only were the 1974 amendments
unconstitutional, but it also determined that the 1966 amendments were
unconstitutional, thus overruling their 1968 decision in Maryland v .
Wirtz (1968).
The Tenth Amendment forbids Congress to exercise power in a- fashion
that would impair the integrity of the states as governmental units or
their ability to function in a federal system.

In Mr. Justice Rehnquist's

opinion he claimed,
One undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the State's power to
determine the wages which shall be paid to those whom they employ in
order to carry out their governmental functions, what hours those
persons will work, and what compensation will be provided where these
employees may be called upon to work overtime. (National League of
Cities v. U'sery, Secretary of Labor, 426 U.S. 845, 1976)
He concluded:

“We hold that insofar as the challenged amendments

operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not
within the authority granted Congress . . .“ .(National League of Cities v. Usery, Secretary of Labor, 426 U.S. 852, 1976).

Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1976).

A

Michigan statute authorizing union representation of local governmental

employees permitted an "agency shop" arrangement, whereby every employee
represented by the union must pay union dues even though not a union
member.

Any employee who failed to comply faced discharge from

employment.

In 1969, the Detroit Federation of Teachers entered into an

"agency shop" agreement with the Detroit Board of Education.

Teachers

opposed to collective bargaining in the public sector challenged the
constitutionality of an agreement which forced them to contribute
financially to support the union's collective bargaining activities.
They also challenged the allocation of part of their "service charge" to
the support of a variety of union activities they alleged were economic,
political, professional, or religious in nature and not related to the
union's collective-bargaining function.
The Court ruled in favor of the union on the collective-bargaining
complaint and in favor of the non-union teachers on the activities not
related to collective-bargaining activities.

The Court held that "service

charges” to non-members are valid when those charges are used for
collective-bargaining, contract-administration, and grievance-adjustment
purposes.

"However, the Constitution requires that funds paid by

employees as a condition of continued government employment not be used
by the union for ideological, political purposes which are not directly
related to its collective-bargaining function" (Zirkel, 197Bb, p. 72).
Mr. Justice Stewart addressed this point as follows;
Our decisions establish with unmistakable clarity that the freedom
of an individual to associate for the purpose of advancing beliefs
and ideas is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments . . . .
Equally clear is the proposition that a government may not require
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an individual to relinquish rights guaranteed him by the First
Amendment as a condition of public employment . . . .

The appellants

argue that they fall within the protection of these cases because
they have been prohibited, not from actively associating, but rather
from refusing to associate.

They specifically argue that they may

constitutionally prevent the Union's spending a part of their
required service fees to contribute to political candidates and to
express political views unrelated to its duties as exclusive
bargaining representative.

We have concluded that this argument is

a meritorious one. fflbood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S.
233-234, 1976)

Harrah Independent School District v. Martin. 440 U.S. 194 (1979).
The respondent, a tenured teacher in Oklahoma, was denied salary increases
during the 1972-74 school years because of her refusal to comply with her
school board's continuing-education requirement which was one of the terms
of her employment contract.

When the Oklahoma legislature enacted a

statute mandating salary increases for teachers regardless of their
compliance with the continuing-education requirement, the school board
notified the respondent that her contract for 1974-75 school year would
not be renewed unless she satisfied the continuing-education requirement.
When she refused to comply, the school board determined that her persistent
noncompliancc constituted "willful neglect"of duty'" and refused to renew
her contract for the ensuing year.

Martin brought action against the

school district, claiming that she had been denied "liberty" and "property"
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without due process of law and equal protection of the laws, as guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court decreed that the. school board's actions did not violate
respondent's due process rights.
The School District has conceded at all times that respondent was a
"tenured" teacher . . . and therefore could be dismissed only for
specified reasons.
due process.

She was accorded the usual elements of procedural

Shortly after the Board's April 1974 meeting, she was

advised of the decision not to renew her contract and of her right
to a hearing before the Board.

At respondent's request, a hearing

was held at which both she and her attorney appeared and
unsuccessfully contested the Board's determination that her refusal
to enroll in the continuing-education courses constituted ."wilful
neglect of duty."

Thus, . . . respondent has no colorable claim of

a denial of procedural due process. (Harrah Independent School
District v. Martin. 440 U.S. 197-198, 1979)
Nor did the Court find that the respondent had been denied
substantive due process.
Respondent's claim that the Board acted arbitrarily in imposing a
new penalty for noncompliance with the continuing-education
requirement simply does not square with the facts.

By making pay

raises mandatory, the state legislature deprived the Board of the
sanction that it had earlier used to enforce its teachers'
contractual obligation to earn continuing-education credits.

The

Board thus turned to contract nonrenewal, but applied this sanction
purely prospectively so that those who might have relied on its
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past practice would nonetheless have an opportunity to bring
themselves into compliance with the terms of their contracts . . . .
Such a course of conduct on the part of a school board responsible
for the public education of students within its jurisdiction, and
employing teachers to perform the principal portion of that task,
can scarcely be described as arbitrary.

Respondent's claim of

denial of substantive due process under these circumstances is
wholly untenable. (Harrah Independent School District v. Martin,
440 U.S. 198-199, 1979)
Likewise, so held the Court, the respondent was not denied equal
protection of the laws.

The Court ruled that the school board's concern

with the educational qualifications of its teacher could not be considered
impermissible.

The school board's continuing-education requirement was

viewed as a legitimate governmental concern.

"The sanction of contract

nonrenewal is quite rationally related to the Board's objective of
enforcing the continuing-education obligation of its teachers.

Respondent

was not, therefore, deprived of equal protection of the laws" (Harrah
Independent School District v. Martin, 440 U.S. 201, 1979).

Church and State Relationships
Most cases involving church-state relationships have required the
courts to make an interpretation of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution which provides, in part, that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof" (United States Constitution, Amendment One).
prohibitions against Congressional action described in the First

The
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Amendment are likewise applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws. (United States Constitution,
Amendment Fourteen)
The first phrase of the First Amendment is known as the establishment
Clause.

Two classes of cases have been decided within the interpretation

of the Establishment Clause:

cases involving the activity of states in

promoting religion by mandating or permitting prayer or Bible reading, and
cases involving the use of tax revenue to aid church-related institutions.
In most instances, when the states have mandated or permitted Bible
reading, prayer, or religious instruction, the Supreme Court has held the
legislation in question to be unconstitutional.

In those cases where

states have allocated tax revenues to church-related institutions, the
Court has allowed such aid when it benefits the child and has disallowed
it when the sectarian institution is the recipient of the aid.
The courts have applied the following three-part test in recent
Establishment Clause cases:

First, does the statute in question have a

"secular legislative purpose"?
advance nor inhibit religion?

Second, does its "primary effect" neither
Third, does the statute and its

administration avoid excessive government entanglement with religion?

If

the Court concludes that the statute before them requires a negative
answer to any one of these three questions, it is likely that the statute
will be declared unconstitutional.
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The second phrase of the First amendment is known as the Free
Exercise Clause.

There have been relatively few decisions by the Supreme

Court involving this clause, but two significant issues have been
determined by the Court on the banis of the Free Exercise Clause:

the

flag salute and the applicability of compulsory school attendance laws
for certain religious sects.

Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
A Louisiana law provided that tax revenue be spent to supply textbooks to
all school children at no charge.

Students of both public and private

schools were the recipients of these books.
included were admittedly sectarian^

Some of the private schools

A group of taxpayers sought to

prevent the Louisiana state board of education from expending funds to
purchase school books and supply them free of charge to the school
children of the state, contending that such expenditures were in violation
of bath the state and federal Constitutions and the Fourteenth Amendment
to the federal Constitution.
The Court held that the Louisiana law providing textbooks to
children attending private sectarian schools as well as those attending
public schools was constitutional.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition

against the deprivation of life, liberty, and property without due process
of law is not applicable in this case because the provision of books to
all school children served a public interest and did not benefit the
interest of the private schools or of parents of students attending those
private schools.
In affirming the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court;
Mr. Chief Justice HugheB quoted from that court's holding:

The appropriations were made Cor the specific purpose of purchasing
school books for the use of the school children of the state, free
of cost to them.

It was for their benefit and the resulting benefit

to the state that the appropriations were made . . . .

The schools,

however, are not the beneficiaries of these appropriations. . . .
The school children and the state alone are the beneficiaries.
{Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U.S. 374-375,
1930)

Board of Education of Central School District Mo. 1 v. Allen,
Commissioner of Education of Hew York, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).

In another

case involving the free use of textbooks for private schools, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of a New York statute.

The New York law

required local public school authorities to loan textbooks free of
charge to all students, of both public and private schools, in grades
seven through twelve.

A local school board sought a declaration that

the statute was unconstitutional as violative of bath clauses of the
First Amendment.
As in the Cochran decision, the Court ruled that such a law is
permissible.

In the opinion of the Supreme Court the statute in

question did not violate the First Amendment's prohibition of a stateestablished religion or prevent the free exercise of religion.

Since

the law was to benefit all school children, whether enrolled in public
or private schools, and since only textbooks approved by school
authorities could be loaned, the Court concluded that the statute was
completely neutral with respect to religion.
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The express purpose of the statute was the furtherance of educational
opportunities for the young, and the law merely makes available to
all children the benefits of a general program to lend school books
free of charge, and the financial benefit is to parents and children,
not to schools. (Board of Education of Central School District Ho. 1
v. Allen, Commissioner of Education of Hew York, 392 U.S. 236, 1968}

Meek v. Pittenger. Secretary of Education, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).

In

1972 the General Assembly of Pennsylvania passed two acts which provided
"auxiliary services" (Act 194) and "instructional materials and equipment"
and loans of textbooks (Act 195) free of charge to nonpublic elementary
and secondary schools.

The "auxiliary services" of Act 194 included

counseling, testing, psychological services, speech and hearing therapy,
and related services for exceptional, remedial, or educationally
disadvantaged students.

The "instructional materials" of Act 195 made

periodicals, textbooks, photographs, maps, charts, recordings, and films
available to nonpublic schools; the "instructional equipment" included
projectors, recorders, and laboratory equipment.

The validity of the two

acts was challenged.
The Supreme Court declared Act 194 and all but the textbook loan
provision of Act 195 unconstitutional, violating the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Citing its decision in Board of Education v. Allen (1968), the
Court upheld the constitutionality of the textbook loan provisions.
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Act 195's textbooks loan provisions, which are limited to textbooks
acceptable for use in the public schools, are constitutional since
they "merely make available to all children the benefits of a
general program to lend school books free of charge," and the
"financial benefit is to parents and children, not to schools."
(Meek v. Plttenger, Secretary of Education, 421 U.S. 350, 1975)
While the Court allowed the state loan of secular textbooks to
nonpublic schools', it found that the provision of "auxiliary services"
and "instructional materials and equipment" was in violation of the
Establishment Clause because it provided too direct and substantial an
aid to private sectarian schools.
The direct loan of instructional materials and equipment to nonpublic
schools authorized by Act 195 has the unconstitutional primary effect
of establishing religion because of the predominantly religious
character of the schools benefiting from the Act since 75% of
Pennsylvania's nonpublic schools that comply with the compulsoryattendance law and thus qualify for aid under Act 195 are church
related or religiously affiliated.

The massive aid that nonpublic

schools receive is neither'indirect nor incidental, and even
though such aid is ostensibly limited to secular instructional
material and equipment the inescapable result is the direct and
substantial advancement of religious activity . . . .

Act 194 also

violates the Establishment Clause because the auxiliary services are
provided at predominantly church-related schools. (Meek v. Plttenger,
Secretary of Education, 421 U.S. 349-350, 1975)
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Vtolman v. Walter. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).

An Ohio law authorized

various £orms of aid to nonpublic schools, most of which were sectarian.
The Ohio Statute authorized funding for the following purposes:
(1) purchasing secular textbooks; (2) supplying standardized testing and
scoring services; (3) providing speech and hearing diagnostic services
and diagnostic psychological services; (4) supplying to students needing
specialized attention, therapeutic, guidance, and remedial services;
(5) purchasing and loaning to pupils or their parents instructional
materials and equipment; and (6) providing field trip transportation and
services.

A group of citizens and taxpayers challenged the statute.

In the opinion of the Court, as. delivered by Mr. Justice Blackmun,
those portions of the law authorizing the state to provide nonpublic
school students with textbooks, standardized testing and scoring,
diagnostic services, and therapeutic and remedial services arc
constitutional.

Those portions authorizing the state to provide

instructional materials and equipment and field trip services are'
unconstitutional, violating the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.
The Court applied the three-part test to the Ohio statute:
in order to pass constitutional muster under the Establishment Clause
a statute (1) must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) must have
a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; and (3) must not foster an excessive government entanglement
with religion. (Holman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 231, 1977)
The Court had no difficulty with the first part of the test; the analytical
difficulty has to do with the effect and entanglement criteria.
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The textbook loan system was similar to those approved by the Court
in Board of Education v. Allen (1968) and in Meek v. Pittenger (1975).
Because the testing and scoring.program was not controlled by the
nonpublic school, and thus there was no need for direct financial aid
(effect) or supervision (entanglement), that portion of the Ohio law was
declared constitutional.
Providing speech and hearing diagnostic services and diagnostic
psychological services on the nonpublic school premises
will not create an iinpermissible risk of fostering ideological views;
hence there is no need for excessive surveillance and there will not
be impermissible church-state entanglement.

The provision of health

services to nonpublic as well as public school children does not
have the primary effect of aiding religion. (Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 230, 1977)
Therefore, that section of the Ohio law that provided for diagnostic
services was found to be constitutional.
Similarly, the therapeutic, guidance, and remedial services, which
were offered only on religiously neutral sites away from the nonpublic
sectarian school, did not have the impermissible effect of advancing
religion.

And since those services would be administered only by public

employees, no excessive entanglement would result.

Thus, the provision

of therapeutic, guidance, and remedial services was declared constitutional.
The Court concluded that the loan of instructional materials and
equipment, even though limited to neutral and secular materials and
equipment, had the primary effect of "providing a direct and substantial
advancement of sectarian education . . . .

It is impossible to separate
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the secular education function from the sectarian, and hence the state
aid in part inevitably supports the religious role of the schools" (Wolman
v. Walter. 433 U.S. 230, 1977).

Therefore, that paragraph of the Ohio

law providing for the purchase and loan of instructional materials and
equipment was declared unconstitutional.
The state support of nonpublic school field trips is a benefit to
sectarian education rather than to individual students.

Also, the state

surveillance of nonpublic school field trips would result in excessive
entanglement.

Thus, that section of the Ohio law providing for state

financing of nonpublic school field trip transportation and services
failed to pass "constitutional muster" on two counts.

Such a statute would

serve to advance religion and would foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion.

Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1
(1947).

A Hew Jersey statute authorized local boards of education to make

rules and contracts for the transportation of children to and from schools.
Acting in accordance with the state statute, one school board authorized
the reimbursement of parents for fares paid -for the transportation of
children attending public and Catholic schools.

Although the state statute

excluded such arrangements for students attending private schools operated
for a profit, it allowed such arrangements for students enrolled in
private, sectarian, not-for-profit schools.

In this case, a district

taxpayer challenged the validity of the state's statute and of the school
board's resolution allowing reimbursement to parents for the transportation
*

of children attending sectarian schools.

The appellant argued that the

69
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was being violated because
the statute and resolution authorized the state to take by taxation the
private property of some and bestow it upon others, to be used for their
own private purposes.

The appellant also claimed that the statute and

resolution forced citizens to pay taxes which were used to help support
and maintain sectarian schools,, contrary to the prohibition of the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause.
By a five-to-four majority, the Court held that a law authorizing
reimbursement of the parents of school children for bus fares to and
from private, sectarian schools, when included in a general program of
reimbursement for the bus fares of public school children, is
constitutional.

In response to the appellant's allegation that the

Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause was being violated, the Court
claimed that "the New Jersey legislature has decided that a public
purpose will be served by using tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares
of all school children, including those who attend parochial schools"
(Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing. 330 U.S. 6,
1947).

The state can legitimately decide that the safe transportation

of all school children is in the public interest.
The Court also failed to allow the allegation
reimbursement scheme violated the First Amendment,

that the
claiming instead that

the statute and resolution were demonstrations of neutrality toward
religion rather than support or establishment of it.

The First Amendment

"requires the state to be neutral in its relations

with groups

of

religious believers and non-believers; it does not

require the

state to
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be their adversary" {Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of
Ewing. 330 U.S. 18, 1947).

Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School District
Ho. 71, Champaign County, Illinois, 333 U.S. 203 (194B).

An Illinois

board of education granted permission to representatives of the Catholic,
Protestant, and Jewish faiths to teach religion classes once a week to
students in grades four though nine.

Pupils whose parents so requested

were granted "released time" for religious instruction and were excused
from their regular secular schedule for that period of time.
students were required to remain in their regular classes.

Other
The religion

teachers were employed by a private, interfaith association and were

*

'

subject to the approval and supervision of the superintendent of schools.
The religious instruction was held during school hours and inside school
facilities.

A resident and taxpayer of the school district challenged

the constitutionality of the program.
Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court;

"This is beyond

all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported public
school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith.
squarely under the ban of the First Amendment . . . "

And it falls

(Illinois ex rel.

McCollum v. Board of Education of School District Ho. 71.'Champaign County,
Illinois. 333 U.S. 210, 1948).

The First Amendment prohibits the

establishment of religion and requires, in the words of Jefferson, a "wall
of separation between church and state."

A program permitting religious

instruction within public school's during school hours and excusing students
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from their regular secular schedule is unconstitutional because it fails
to maintain the required separation of church and state.
Zn his opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter concluded:
We renew our conviction that Hwe have staked the very existence of
our country on the faith that complete separation between the state
and religion is best for the state and best for religion" (Everson
v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 59, 1947).

If nowhere else, in the

relation between Church and State, "good fences make good
neighbors." (Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of
School District No. 71, Champaign County, Illinois, 333 U.S. 232,
1948.

Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).

Pursuant to a section of the

New Vork Education Law, the New York City board of education permitted its
public schools to release students during school hours, on written
permission of their parents, so that they might leave the school building
to go to religious centers for religious instruction or devotional
I

exercises.

Those students who are not released for religious purposes are

required to remain in school.

The participating religious centers

provided weekly reports to the schools, sending the names of children
released from the schools who failed to report for religious instruction.
All costs of this program were paid for by the religious organizations
involved.

The program involved neither religious instruction in the public

school buildings nor expenditure of public funds.

Taxpayers and residents

of New York City challenged the law, contending that it was in essence not
different from the one involved in tho McCollum case.
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The Court upheld the constitutionality of this section of the
New York Education Law,

The Court argued that in releasing children

from school for religious instruction the state had not acted counter
to the First Amendment.

As long as the religious instruction takes

place outside the schools' facilities and requires no state financial
support there can be no claim of an establishment of religion.

The

opinion of the Court was delivered by Mr. Justice Douglas, who concluded
by saying:
In the McCollum case the classrooms were used for religious
instruction and the force of the public school was used to promote
that instruction.

Here . . . the public schools do no more than

accommodate their schedules to a program of outside religious
instruction.

We follow the McCollum case.

Gut we cannot expand it

to cover the present released time program unless separation of Church
and State means that public instruction can make no adjustments of
their schedules to acconmodate the religious needs of the people.

We

cannot read into the Bill of Rights such a philosophy of hostility to
religion. (Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 315, 1952)

Engel v. Vitale, 37 0 U.S. 421 (1962).

■

The New York Board of Regents,

overseers of that state's public school system, composed a twenty-two word
nondenominational prayer as a part of their "Statement on Moral and
Spiritual Training in the Schools" program.

This prayer was published and

distributed to the local boards of education throughout the state with the
recommendation that it be recited at the beginning of each school day by
the students in the public schools of New York.

Shortly after one local
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school district began the practice of reciting the prayer, the parents of
ten students brought action in a New York State Court.

These parents

claimed that the actions of official governmental agencies in ordering
the recitation of the prayer had violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.

The state courts of New York upheld the practice of

reciting the Regents' prayer so long as the schools did not compel any
student to join in the prayer.

Students who were offended by the prayer

were allowed to remain silent or to be excused from the room while the
prayer was being recited.
The Court decided that the state's encouragement of the regular
recitation of prayer in the public school system was in direct violation
of the First Amendment's prohibition of a governmental establishment of
religion.
The fact that the program, as modified and approved by state courts,
does not require all pupils to recite the prayer but permits those
who wish to do so to remain silent or be excused from the room,
ignores the essential nature of the program's constitutional defects.
Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally neutral nor
the fact that its observance on the part of students is voluntary can
serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment Clause,
as it might from the Free Exercise Clause, of the First Amendment,
both of which arc operative against the States by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment. (Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 430, 1962)

School District of Abinqton Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp, Murray
v. Curlett, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

A Pennsylvania law'required that at least

ten verses from the Bible be read without comment at the opening of each
school day.

This Bible reading was followed by the recitation of the

Lord's Prayer.

Participation in these exercises was voluntary, and

students and parents were advised that the student could absent himself
from the classroom or, should he choose to remain in the room, not
participate in the exercise.

The city of Baltimore had a similar

provision, consisting of the reading, without comment, of a chapter from
the Bible and/or the recitation of the Lord's Prayer.

The Schempp and

Murray families challenged the constitutionality of the state statute and
municipal regulations, respectively.
The Court struck down the Pennsylvania statute and the Baltimore
regulations as unconstitutional, clearly contradictory of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.
The conclusion follows that in both cases the laws require religious
exercises and such exercises are being conducted in direct violation
of the rights of the appellees and petitioners.

Nor are these

required exercises mitigated by the fact that individual students
may absent themselves upon parental request, for that fact furnishes
no defense to a claim of unconstitutionality under the Establishment
Clause. (School District of Ablngton Township, Pennsylvania v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 224-225)

Chamberlin v. Dade County Board of Public Instruction. 377 U.S. 402
1964).

A Florida statute required devotional Bible reading and the

recitation of prayers in Florida public schools.

The Florida Supreme

Court declared the statute constitutional, but the United States Supreme
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Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court's decision per curiam declaring
the Florida statute unconstitutional.

Following their decision in School

District of flbinqton Township v. Schempp (1963), the Court held that the
reading of Bible verses and the recitation of prayers on school property,
during school hours, and under the supervision of school personnel was
in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
(Chamberlin v. Dade County Board of Public Instruction, 377 U.S. 402,
1964).

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

Members of the Old Order

Amish religion and the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church were convicted
of violating Wisconsin's con$>ulsory school-attendance law.

This

Wisconsin law required a child's school attendance until age sixteen.
The Amish respondents refused to send their children to any formal school,'
public or1private, after they had graduated from the eighth grade because
they believed that high school attendance was contrary to their religion
and way of life and that they would endanger their own salvation and that
of their children by complying with the law.

The evidence showed that

the Amish provide continuing informal vocation training for their children
which is specifically designed to prepare them for adult life and
religious practice within the Amish community.

Testimony was also

presented which showed that the Amish children would likely become selfsufficient citizens.

Three Amish families challenged the constitutionality

of the Wisconsin compulsory school-attendance law as it applied to them,
claiming that it violated the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment.
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The Court ruled in favor of the Amish, declaring the Wisconsin
compulsory attendance law unconstitutional.
Thus, a State's interest in universal education, however highly we
rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it
impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those
specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect to
the religious upbringing of their children . . . .

[Wisconsin v .

Yoder, 406 U.S. 214, 1972)
The Court concluded that the Amish had adequately supported their
claim that enforcement of the compulsory attendance law after the eighth
grade would prevent the free exercise of their religious beliefs.
In sum, the unchallenged testimony of acknowledged experts in
education and religious history, almost 300 years of consistent
practice, and strong evidence of a sustained faith pervading and
regulating respondents' entire mode of life support the claim that
enforcement of the State's requirement of compulsory formal education
after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free
exercise of respondents' religious beliefs. (Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 219, 1972)
The Court also denied the state's argument that it was empowered as
parens patriae to override the parents' interest for the benefit of the
children.

The Amish respondents presented convincing evidence that their

way of life would not impair the physical or mental health of the children
and would not create adults incapable, of being self-supporting, responsible
citizens.
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Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court and
concluded:
Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious
sect and a long history as a successful and self-sufficient segment
of American society, the Amish in this case have convincingly
demonstrated the sincerity of their religious beliefs, the
interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, the vital role
that belief and daily conduct play in the continued survival of Old
Order Amish communities and their religious organization, and the
hazards presented by the State's enforcement of a statute generally
valid as to others.

Beyond this, they have carried the even more

difficult burden of demonstrating the adequacy of their alternative
mode of continuing informal vocational education in terms of precisely
those overall interests that the State advances in support of its
program of compulsory high school education.

Zn light of this

convincing showing, one that probably few other religious groups or
sects could make, and weighing the minimal difference between what
the State would require and what the Amish already accept, it was
incumbent on the State to show with more particularity how its
admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely
affected by granting an exemption to the Amish. (Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 235-236, 1972)

Wheeler v. Barrera. 417 U.S. 402 C1974).

Chapter I (formerly Title I)

of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 provides for
federal funding of remedial programs for educationally deprived children

in both public and private schools.

The primary responsibility for

designing and implementing such a program rests with the local educational
agency, which program must then be approved by the state educational
agency and the U.S. Department of Education.

Respondents, parents of

children attending nonpublic schools in Kansas City, Missouri, brought
class action against state school officials, alleging that the state
school officials had "arbitrarily and illegally" approved a Title I plan
(so called here because it was under this designation that the Supreme
Court heard this case) that deprived private school children of services
comparable to those offered to public school children.

The defendants,

state school officials, claimed that the aid sought by the respondents
exceeded Title I's requirements and violated the State's Constitution,
state law, and public policy.
The Title I Handbook stated only that the local educational agency's
plan provide eligible private school students with services that were
"comparable in quality, scope, and opportunity for participation to those
provided for public school children with needs of equally high priority."
The law does not require that identical services be provided.

Although

over sixty-five percent of Title I funds allocated to Missouri had been
used to provide personnel for remedial instruction, state officials had
refused to appropriate any money to provide similar remedial instruction
at nonpublic schools.
The Supreme Court decided that the state school officials had failed
to comply with the Elementary and Secondary Education Act's requirements.
But the Court cautioned that their decision was not to be interpreted to
mean that the state school officials were required to submit and approve
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plans that employed the use of Title I teachers on private school premises
during regular school hours.

This on-the-premises private school

instruction by public school Title 1 teachers was what the respondents
claimed they were entitled to by virtue of the Title 1 provisions.
In the opinion of the Court, as delivered by Mr. Justice Blackmun:
The Court of Appeals properly recognized, as we have noted, that
petitioners failed to meet their broad obligation and commitment
under the Act to provide comparable programs,

"Comparable,” however,

does not mean "identical," and, contrary to the assertions of both
sides, we do not read the Court of Appeals' opinion or, for that
matter, the Act itself, as ever requiring that identical services be
provided in nonpublic schools,

congress recognized that the needs

of educationally deprived children attending nonpublic schools might
be different from those of similar children in public schools; it
was also recognized that in some States certain programs for private
and parochial schools would be legally impossible because of state
constitutional restrictions, most notable in the church-state area
... .

Title I was not intended to override these individualized

state restrictions.

Rather, there was a clear intention that the

assistance programs be designed on local levels so as to accommodate
the restrictions.

(Wheeler v. Barrera. 417 U.S. 420-421, 1974)

Although it may be difficult, the Court said, it is not impossible
to design and implement a legal Title I program that would provide
"comparable" services despite the prohibition of on-the-premises
instruction in the private schools.
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Under the Act, respondents are entitled to comparable services . . . .
As we have stated repeatedly herein, they are not entitled to any
particular form of service, and it is the role of the state and local
agencies, and not of the federal courts, at least at this stage, to
formulate a suitable plan. (Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 428, 1974}

Race, Language, and Sex Discrimination
One of the distinguishing characteristics of the American ideal has
been the tradition of compulsory, universal education through a system of
free, public schools.

This tradition carries with it the notion that

education is available to all, regardless of their cultural, racial,
religious, or ethnic background.

Because ours is a pluralistic society,

the problems of universal education for all Americans have been
considerable.

As a result there have been a number of court cases

involving alleged discriminatory practices in the fulfillment of this
American dream of universal education.
Discrimination, issues flow primarily from the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the applicable section of which reads:
" ...

No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction

the equal protection of the laws" (United States Constitution, Amendment
Fourteen).
The bulk of the discrimination cases tried in the American judicial
system have been racial discrimination issues.

Perhaps the most well-

known of all United States Supreme Court decisons impacting on education
was the Brown v. Board of Education (1954) decision.
pointed out that

Zirkel (1978b)
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in retrospect one sees that when the Supreme Court ruled that
segregation of school children on the basis of race was
unconstitutional, the Constitution changed much more significantly
than the schools.

In practice, the decision failed, as Brown II

(1955) did, to inspire reform in the schools "with all deliberate
speed." (p, 74)
Another aspect of discrimination emerged with the Lau v. Hichols
(1974) decision.

This decision.and others like it mandated that the

schools must adapt to meet the language needs of its non-English-speaking
clientele,

in recent years sex discrimination charges have been added to

the dockets of many of our nation's courts, including the Supreme Court.
Although there have been relatively few sex discrimination cases tried
before the Supreme Court, it appears to be an area of increasing litigation.

Plessy v. Ferguson. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

An act of the legislature

of Louisiana, passed in 1890, required all railway companies to provide
"equal but separate" accomodations for whites and blacks.

A second section

of the act provided criminal penalties for passengers who insisted on
being seated in a car not reserved for their own race.

Plessy, a citizen

of the United States and a resident of Louisiana, challenged the
constitutionality of the Louisiana act, claiming that it violated the
Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery, and the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the law requiring
segregation of the races in railway cars and providing for separate but
equal facilities.

In response to the Thirteenth Amendment argument, the
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Court said:
A statute which implies merely a' legal distinction between the white
and colored races— a distinction which is founded in the color of the
two races, and which must alwayB exist so long as white men are
distinguished from the other race by color— has no tendency to
destroy the legal equality of the two races, or re-establish a state
of involuntary servitude. (Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 543, 1896)
The Court also concluded that the Louisiana act did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment by abridging the privileges or immunities of United
States citizens, or depriving persons of liberty or property without due
process of law, or by denying them the equal protection of the laws.

The

Court determined that although the Fourteenth Amendment required
political equality between whites and blacks it did not require social
commingling.
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute
equality of the two races before the law, but, in the nature of
things, it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions
based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from
political, equality, or a coinningling of the two races upon terms
unsatisfactory to either. <Plessy v. Ferguson. 163 U.S. 544, 1896)

Gong Lum v. Rice. 275 U.S. 78 (1927).

Thirty years after the Plessy

decision, the State Superintendent of Education of Mississippi excluded
Gong Lum's daughter from attending a white school because she was of
Chinese descent and not a member of the white race.

The superintendent

was acting in accordance with a section of the state's constitution which
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provided that "separate schools shall be maintained for children of the
white and colored races."

Gong Lum contended that the provisions denied

him and his daughter equal protection of the laws.
The Court ruled that the Mississippi Constitution did not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment's Bqual Protection Clause.

The state's decision

to place Chinese students in the black schools and not in schools for
whites was found to be within the state's authority.

The Court held that

although most cases involving racial discrimination involved separate
schools for whites and blacks,
. . . we can not think that the question is any different or that
any different result can be reached . . . where the issue is as
between white pupils and pupils of the yellow races.

The decision

is within the discretion of the state in regulating its public
schools and does not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment. (Gong Lum
v. Rice, 275 U.S. 87, 1927)

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka ("Brown I"), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
In what has been proclaimed by many as the most significant Supreme Court
decision affecting education, the Supreme Court reversed the Plessy
decision and decreed that the doctrine of "separate but equal" had no place
in the field of public education.

Four separate cases from Kansas,

South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware were consolidated and decided in
this landmark case.

In each case, black children sought admission to the

public schools of their community on a non-segregated basis.
case, admission had been denied.

In each

Kansas, by state law, permitted but did

not require separate schools for blacks and whites; South Carolina,
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Virginia, and Delaware had state constitutional and statutory provisions
which required the segregation of blacks and whites in the public schools.
Residents and taxpayers who challenged these laws were denied relief
by the lower courts, except in the Delaware case.

The courts in Kansas,

South Carolina, and Virginia based their decisions on the "separate but
equal" doctrine permitted under Plessy v. Ferguson (1896).

The Delaware

court granted relief because the schools which black children attended
were found to be inferior; thus, the "separate but equal" doctrine could
not validate the Delaware system.

The plaintiffs appealed to the highest

court in the land, contending that "segregated public schools are not
•equal' and cannot be made 'equal,1 and that hence they are deprived of
the equal protection of the laws" (Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka.
347 U.S. 488, 1954).
Mr. Chief Justice Warren presented the question, and the Court's
answer:
Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis
of race, even though the physical facilities and other "tangible"
factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of
equal educational opportunities?

We believe that it does. (Brown v .

Board of Education of TOpeka. 347 U.S. 493, 1954)
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of
"separate but equal" has no place.
are inherently unequal.

Separate educational facilities

Therefore, we hold, that the plaintiffs and

others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are,
by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal
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protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. (Brown
V. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 495, 1954)

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka ("Brown II”), 349 U.S. 294
(1955).

The Brown I decision declared the fundamental principle that

racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional and that all
provisions of federal, state, and local law which required'or permitted
such discrimination must yield to this principle.
Recognizing the complexities involved in moving from a dual,
segregated system to a unitary system of public education, the Court
provided the following guidelines:
Full implementation of these constitutional principles may require
solution of varied local school problems.

School authorities have

the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving
these problems; courts will have to consider whether the action of
school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the
governing constitutional principles.

(Brown v. Board of Education of

Topeka. 349 U.S. 299, 1955)
However, the Court pointed out, equal educational opportunity cannot
be delayed while the public school authorities debate all the particulars
of compliance.
was required.

A "prompt and reasonable start" toward full compliance
Public schools which admitted students on a racially

nondiscriminatory basis were to become a reality "with all deliberate
speed."
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Goss v. Board of Education of Knoxville, Tennessee, 373 U.S. 683
(1963).

Nine years after the first Brown decision the Court heard, in

Goss v. Board of Education (1963), of one of a number of ill-designed
plans for desegregation.

The Court had realized that there would be a

variety of obstacles that would arise in the transition from dual to
unitary school systems; but the Court had also mandated "good faith
compliance at the earliest practicable date."

Two Tennessee school

boards had proposed desegregation' plans which provided for the rezoning
of school districts without reference to race.

Each plan also contained

a transfer provision which would allow any student to request a transfer
from the school to which he was assigned to a school where he would be in
the racial majority.
Black students and their parents challenged the desegregation plans
of these two school boards.

Mr. Justice Clark observed:

The question centers around substantially similar transfer provisions
incorporated in formal desegregation plans adopted by the respective
local school boards pursuant to court orders.

The claim is that the

transfer programs are invalid because they are based solely on race
and tend to perpetuate the pre-existing racially segregated school
system.

Under the over-all desegregation plans presented to the

trial courts, school districts would be rezoned without reference to
race.

However, by the terms of the transfer provisions, a student,

upon request, would be permitted, solely on the basis of his own race
and the racial composition of the school to which he had been assigned
by virtue of rezoning, to transfer from such school, where he would be
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in the racial minority, back to his former segregated school where
his race would be in the majority. (Goss v. Board of Education of
Knoxville, Tennessee, 373 U.S. 6B4, 1963)
The Court reasoned that because the transfer plans were based solely
on racial factors that they would ultimately lead back to segregation of
the races and thus served to perpetuate racial segregation.

This, the

Court concluded, ran counter to the mandate of the two Brown decisions,
and could not be permitted.

For this reason the Supreme Court held that

the transfer plans were in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause.

Mr. Justice Clark concluded:

Not only is race the factor upon which the transfer plans operate,
but also the plan lacks a provision whereby a student might with
equal facility transfer from a segregated to a desegregated school.
The obvious one-way operation of these two factors in combination
underscores the purely racial character of and purpose of the
transfer provisions.

We hold that the transfer plans promote

discrimination and are therefore invalid. (Goss v. Board of Education
of Knoxville, Tennessee, 373 U.S. 688, 1963)

Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S.
218 (1964).

This litigation began in 1951 and was included among the four

separate cases of Brown I (1954) in which the Supreme Court held that
Virginia's school segregation laws were unconstitutional.

The Court

ordered in Brown II (1955), that black students of Prince Edward County
be admitted to the public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis
"with all deliberate speed."
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Efforts to desegregate Prince Edward County public schools met with
considerable resistance.

After an unsuccessful attempt to close any

public schoolB where whites and blacks were enrolled together and to cut
off state funds to nonsegregated schools, the General Assembly of
Virginia,.in 1959, repealed the compulsory attendance law and made school
attendance a local option.

The Prince Edward County school board refused

to appropriate funds for the operation of public schools.

Meanwhile, a

private foundation operated schools for white children only and in 1960
became eligible for county and state tuition grants.
The Court ruled that " . . .

closing the Prince Edward County schools

while public schools in all the other counties were being maintained
denied the petitioners and the class of Negro students they represent the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by,the Fourteenth Amendment"
(Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County. 377 U.S. 225,
1964).
Recognizing the deliberate efforts of Prince Edward County officials
to circumvent the holdings of the two Brown decisions, the Court said that
the time for mere "deliberate speed" has run out, and that phrase can
no longer justify denying these Prince Edward County school children
their constitutional rights to an education equal to that afforded
by the public schools in the other parts of Virginia. (Griffin v.
County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 234, 1964)

Green v. County School Board of Hew Kent County. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
The New Kent County school system operated two schools, one on the east
side and one on the west side of New Kent County, Virginia.

Approximately

one-half of the county's population was black, but there was no residential
segregation, members of both races residing throughout the county.

In

spite of the decisions of Brown I and Brown II in 1954 and 1955, the New
Kent County school board continued to racially segregate students.

Each

school served the whole county, and twenty-one buses traveled overlapping
routes to transport students to their designated school.

In 1965, the

board, in order to remain eligible for federal financial aid, adopted a
Hfreedom-of-choice" plan for desegregating the schools.

The plan permitted

students, except those entering the first and eighth grades, to choose
annually between schools.

Those not stating their choice were assigned to

the school they had previously attended.

First and eighth graders were

required to make a definite choice between the two schools.

During the

first three years of the "freedom-of-choice" plan no white student had
chosen to attend the all-black school, and although 115 blacks had enrolled
in the formerly all-white school, eighty-five percent of the black
students in the district still attended the all-black school.

The adequacy

of the "freedom-of-choice" plan was challenged in this case.
The Court ruled that the New Kent hfreedom-of-choice" was unacceptable
because it had not resulted in the "racially nondiscriminatory school
system" called for in Brown II.

Although the Court did not go so far in

this case as to declare "freedom-of-choice" plans unconstitutional, it did
express that experience had indicated that it was an ineffective tool for
desegregation and suggested other alternatives for complying with the Brown
decisions.
The burden is on a school board to provide a plan that promises
realistically to work now, and a plan that at this late date fails to
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provi.de a meaningful assurance of prompt and effective
disestablishment of a dual system is intolerable. (Green v. County
School Board of New Kent County.. 391 U.S. 430, 1968)
In the opinion of the Court, a "freedom-of-choice" plan offered
little promise that the required unitary, nonsegregated school system
would be established.

New, effective desegregation plans needed to be

established without further delay so that the Fourteenth Amendment's
requirement of equal protection of the laws for the black students could
be met.
Zirkel (1978b) claimed that the Green case set the stage for a new
era in school desegregation.
It was in Green that the Court first adopted the percentage of blackwhite students attending a given school as the primary measurement
of whether a desegregation plan had been effective in achieving a
unitary, nonracial school system.

But instead of reducing the number

of desegregation cases, the Green decision actually increased the
litigation as school systems began to avail themselves of the
apparent loopholes left by that decision.

These loopholes included

the failure of the Court to define what a working desegregation plan
would entail and the failure to specify what a unitary school system
was.

The ambiguity surrounding these two points generated confusion

and further litigation, (p. 75)
Beginning with the Green decision the Supreme Court became more actively
involved in the desegregation process.
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United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 U.S. 225
(1969).

From 1964 to 1968, the local District Court judge had worked to

push the Montgomery County, Alabama Board of Education to achieve racial
desegregation of the county's schools.

Since the Montgomery County Board

of Education had taken no steps to integrate the public schools in the
ten years after the Brown I decision, the courts intervened.
Obviously voluntary integration by the local school officials in
Montgomery had not proved to be even partially successful.
Consequently, if Negro children of school age were to receive their
constitutional rights as we had declared them to exist, the coercive
assistance of courts was imperatively called for. (United States v .
Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 U.S. 228, 1969)
In 1964 the District Court judge began to offer this “coercive
assistance.n

In his initial order the judge required integration of

certain grades and followed this with annual proceedings, including reports
by the school board and hearings, opinions, and court orders.

One of the

provisions of the District Court judge's 1968 order dealt with faculty
and staff desegregation.

The judge ordered the nonracial allocation of

faculty and staff with fixed mathematical ratios throughout the Bystem.
It was this reliance on mathematical ratios which the school board
challenged.
Citing the Montgomery County school board's history of noncompliance
and delay in creating a "system of public education freed of racial
discrimination" as required in Brown II, the Court upheld the order of
the District Court judge requiring fixed mathematical ratios.
the patience and wisdom of the judge, the Court concluded:

Praising
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"Judge Johnson's order now before us was adopted in the spirit of this
Court's opinion in Green v. County School Board, . . .

in that his plan

'promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work
now111 (United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 U.S.
235, 1969).

The Brown decision required the establishment of unitary

school systems.

The Court held that the nonracial assignment of faculty

and staff is an acceptable method of satisfying that requirement,

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
In the 1968-69 school year the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system had
more than 84,000 students.
students were black.

Approximately twenty-nine percent of these

Despite a desegregation plan, adopted by the school

board and approved by the District Court and which was based on
geographic zoning of attendance,zones with a free-transfer provision, the
schools remained largely segregated.

In 1968 petitioner Swann moved for

further relief based on the Green requirement that school boards "come
forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises
realistically to work now."
When the school board failed to produce a satisfactory plan, one was
imposed by the District Court.

This plan relied upon zoning, pairing,

and grouping techniques whereby several outlying elementary schools were
grouped with each black inner city school in order to achieve a more
acceptable racial balance.

For the high schools and junior high schools,

simple restructuring of school attendance zones achieved the racial
balance sought.

The implementation of the plan required extensive busing.

The plan also required that as far as practicable, the schools ought to
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reflect the seventy-one to twenty-nine white-to-black student ratio of
the district.

In this case the school board challenged the District

Court's plan, contending that it was unreasonable and too burdensome.
Reiterating its holding of Brown I# the Supreme Court declared that
segregation of public schools on the basis of race constitutes a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court declared in their holding in this case that when school
authorities default in their obligation to provide acceptable remedies,
the district courts have broad powers to fashion remedies that will assure
unitary school systems.

That power includes:

(1) the prerogative to

order that teachers be assigned in such a fashion that a certain degree
of faculty desegregation is achieved; (2) the right to forbid patterns of
school construction and abandonment which serve to perpetuate or
re-establish a dual system; (3) the right to impose mathematical ratios
and racial quotas as a starting point in shaping a desegregation plan;
(4) the right to alter school attendance zones, including the grouping
and pairing of noncontiguous zones, to achieve desegregation; and (5) the
right to require busing of students to a school not closest to the
students' hones in order to achieve desegregation.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court:
The objective today remains to eliminate from the public schools all
vestiges of state-imposed segregation.

Segregation was the evil

struck down by Brown I as. contrary to the equal protection guarantees
of the Constitution.

That was the violation sought to ,be corrected

by the remedial measures of Brown II.

That was the basis for the

holding in Green that school authorities are "clearly charged with
the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to
convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be
eliminated root and branch."
If school authorities fail in their affirmative obligations under
these holdings, judicial authority may be invoked.

Once a right and

a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's
equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and
flexibility are inherent in.equitable remedies. (Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education. 402 U.S. 15, 1971)

Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).

A Mississippi statutory

program, begun In 1940, had provided textbooks to students in both public
and private schools without reference to whether any participating private
school had racially discriminatory policies.

Under the Mississippi

program, the state purchased the textbooks then loaned them to the
schools in the state.

Between 1963 and 1970, the number of private,

nonsectarian schools in Mississippi increased from seventeen to 155 and
enrollment in such schools increased from 2362 to approximately 42,000.
It was apparent that the creation and growth of these private schools was
a direct response to the mandate to desegregate the public school systems
of Mississippi.
Hhile reaffirming their opinion that private schools have the right
to exist and operate, the Supreme Court in this case denied that the Bqual
Protection Clause requires the state to provide assistance to private
schools.
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A State's special interest in elevating the quality of education in
both public and private schools does not mean that the State must
grant aid to private schools without regard to constitutionally
mandated standards forbidding state-supported discrimination.

That

the Constitution may compel toleration of private discrimination in
some circumstances does not mean that it requires state support for
such discrimination. (Norwood v. Harrison. 413 U.S. 462-463, 1973)
The Court also decreed that free textbooks, like tuition grants to
students in private schools, were a form of financial assistance which
benefited the schools themselves.

By providing tangible aid in the form

of free textbooks to schools which engage in racially discriminatory
practices, the state gives support to discrimination.

"Racial

discrimination in state-operated schools is barred by the Constitution"
.

. . (Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 465, 1973).

The Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the state from granting
tangible, specific financial aid to private, segregated schools.

Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).

Two black children applied

for admission to private, nonsectarian schools and were subsequently
denied admission solely on the basis of race.

In this case, the children

challenged the private schools' practice of racial discrimination as
being counter to Title 42 U.S.C. section 1981.

Title 42 U.S.C. section

1981, as part of the Civil Rights Act of.1866, provides that "all persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the .same right in
every state . . .
white citizens .

to make and enforce-contracts . . .

as is enjoyed by

The principal issue in this case was whether section 1981 prohibits
private schools from refusing admission to otherwise qualified children
solely because they are black, and if so, whether that federal law is
constitutional as so applied.
both parts of the question.

The Court answered in the affirmative to
According to the interpretation of the

Supreme Court, section 1981 "prohibits private, comnercially operated,
nonsectarian schools from denying admission to prospective students
because they are Negroes" (Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 161, 1976).

The

federal law expressly prohibits racial discrimination in the making and
enforcing of private contracts, and the racial discrimination practiced
by the two schools amounted to a "classic violation" of section 1981.
The parents of the two black children sought to enter into contractual
arrangements with the schools, but "neither school offered services on an
equal basis to white and nonwhite students" (Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
172-173, 1976).
The Court also concluded that section 1981, as applied in this case,
does not violate the constitutionally protected rights of free association
and privacy, or a parent's right to direct the education of his children.
It may be assumed that parents have a right to send their children
to schools that promote

the belief that racial segregation is

desirable, and that the

children have aright to attend such schools,

[but] it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial
minorities from such schools is also protected by the same principle.
(Runvon v. McCrary. 427

U.S. 161, 1976)

Lau v. Hichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).

This class action was brought

by non-Ehglish-speaking Chinese students against officials responsible
for the operation of the San Francisco school system.

The California

Education Code calls for mastery of the English language by students in
California schools, but about 1000 Chinese-speaking students were
receiving no remedial English language instruction nor any other
compensatory program.

This class of students claimed that the

San Francisco school board denied them opportunity to participate in the
public educational program.

The Chinese-speaking students alleged that

the school board's failure to provide them with an equal educational
opportunity violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 601

prohibits recipients of federal financial assistance from discriminating
against students on the basis of race, color, or national origin.

The

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare had authority to promulgate
regulations to safeguard the provisions of section 601.

In 1968 the

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare issued a guideline which
stated that "^sjchool systems are responsible for assuring that students
of a particular race, color, or national origin are not denied the
opportunity to obtain the education generally obtained by other students
in the system" (33 Federal Register 4956).

A 1970 HEW guideline was more

to the point!
Where inability to speak and understand the English language excludes
national origin-minority group children from effective participation
in the educational program offered by a school district, the district
muBt take affirmative steps to rectify the language deficiency in
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order to open its instructional program to these students. (35
Federal Register 11595)
The Court determined that the failure to provide non-English-speaking
students with special instruction denied them a meaningful opportunity to
participate in the public education program and thus violated section 601
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the HEW regulations and guidelines.
The Court did not decide whether the school system* s failure to provide
such a program violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteehth
Amendment.

"A school district receiving federal aid must provide special

instruction for non-English-speaking students whose education is severely
hampered by the language barrier, at least when there are substantial
numbers of such students within the district" {Zirkel, 1978b, p. 98).

Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, Cohen v. Chesterfield County
School Board. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).

Pregnant public school teachers brought

action in these companion cases challenging the mandatory maternity leave
rules of the Cleveland, Ohio, and Chesterfield County, Virginia, school
boards.

The Cleveland rule required a pregnant teacher to take unpaid

maternity leave five months before the expected birth, with application
for leave to be made at least two weeks prior to her departure.

A teacher

on maternity leave was not eligible .to return to work until the beginning
of the next regular semester after her child was three months old.

A

physician's certificate of physical fitness was also required prior to
her return to work.
The Chesterfield County rule .required pregnant teachers to leave work
at least four months prior to the expected birth, with notice to be given
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at least six months before the anticipated birth.

Return to work was

guaranteed no later than the first day of the school year after the date
she presented a physician's certificate of fitness.
The Court held that the mandatory termination provisions of both
school systems violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The school boards argued that their rules were necessary for two reasons:
to maintain continuity of instruction and to assure that students have a
physically capable instructor in the classroom.
Thus, while the advance-notice provisions in the Cleveland and
Chesterfield County rules are wholly rational and may well be
necessary to serve the objective of continuity of instruction, the
absolute requirements of termination at the end of the fourth or
fifth month of pregnancy are not. (Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur. 414 U.S. 642, 1974)
Recognizing that the mandatory germination provisions of the two
school systems1 rules were designed to protect students from potentially
incapacitated pregnant teachers, the Court felt that the rules swept too
broadly,
for the provisions amount to a conclusive presumption that every
pregnant teacher who reaches the fifth or sixth month of pregnancy
is physically incapable of continuing . . . .

The rules contain an

irrebuttable presumption of physical incompetency, and that
presumption applies even when the medical evidence as to an
individual woman's physical status might be wholly to the contrary.
(Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur. 414 U.S. 644, 1974)
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The Court also concluded that Cleveland's provisions that the teacher
was not eligible to return to work until her child reached an age of three
months violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
a rule, the Court said, is arbitrary and irrational.

Such

The Chesterfield

County return rule was found to be permissible..

Vorchelmer v. School District of Philadelphia. 532 2d 880 (3d Circuit
1976).

A female high school student who had been denied admission to an

all-male academic high school because of her gender challenged the
constitutionality of her rejection.

The Philadelphia school district

offers two types of college preparatory programs:
academic.

comprehensive and

The comprehensive high schools provide a wide range of courses,

including those required for college admission.

The only criterion for

enrollment in the comprehensive schools is residence within a designated
zone.

All but three of Philadelphia's comprehensive schools are

coeducational.
Philadelphia.

There are only two academic high schools in the city of
These have high admission standards (only seven percent of

the students in the city qualify) and serve the whole city.

One of the

two academic schools enrolls only male students, the other only female
studentB.

Enrollment at these schools is strictly voluntary.

The two

academic schools are conparable in quality and offer essentially equal
educational opportunities.
The plaintiff argued that the school district’s refusal to admit her
to the all-male academic high school was in violation of the Equal
Education Opportunities Act of 1974 and of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.

The decision rendered by the Court of Appeals,
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which decision the United States Supreme Court affirmed, stated:
Where record disclosed no inequality in opportunity for education
between two public high schools^ one of which had exclusively male
students and the other of which had exclusively female students,
policy declaration of Equal Education Opportunities Act that children
are entitled to "equal educational opportunity" without regard to
race, color, or sex was inapplicable and did not require finding
that maintenance of two sex-segregated public high schools was
contrary to public policy. fVorcheimer v. School District of
Philadelphia, 532, 2d 880, 3d Circuit 1976)
In response to the claim that the plaintiff had been denied equal
protection of the laws, the Court of Appeals answered:
Where attendance at either of two sex-segregated public high schools
was voluntary and educational opportunities offered at the two
schools were essentially equal and where the school system was
otherwise coeducational, public school system's regulations which
established admission requirements to the two high schools based on
gender classification did not offend the equal protection clause
of the United States Constitution. (Vorcheimer v. School District of
Philadelphia. 532, 2d 880, 3d Circuit 1976)

School District Finance and Organization
The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
powers not delegated to the federal government by the Constitution are
reserved to the states.

Because‘education is not mentioned in the

Constitution, it is generally assumed, then, to be a state power.

State
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legislatures have exercised this power by organizing and financing a
system of free public schools.

With few exceptions the United States

Supreme Court has extended broad powers to the states in matters of
school district finance and organization.

The Supreme Court has concluded

that it is indeed within a state's power to establish and operate a
system of free public education.

In those few instances where the court

has struck down a state's educational policy, the issue has centered on
the Constitutional question of equal protection of the laws.

In these

cases, the Court has held that the rights of a class of individuals to
equal protection of the laws, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,
supersede the states' right to organize and finance the public school
systems.

Attorney General of the State of Michigan ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey.
199 U.S. 233 <1905).

The constitution of the state of Michigan requires

the legislature to establish and provide a system of public education.
In accordance with this requirement the legislature passed laws establishing
school districts.

In this case, a law enacted in 1881 established four

school districts in Somerset and Moscow townships of Hillsdale County.
In 1901, new legislation incorporated portions of the four original
districts to create a new district.

The defendants challenged the

validity of the act creating the new district.
resolved by the Court was:

The question to be

Does the legislature have the authority to

alter school district boundaries?

The defendants argued that the

Constitutional guarantees of republican government {Article IV, section 4},
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of the unimpaired right of contracts (Article I, section 10), and of the
due process of the laws in protecting property rights (Amendment Fourteen)
had been violated.
The Court ruled that "the legislature of the state has absolute
power to make and change subordinate municipalities," (Attorney General of the State of Michigan ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey. 26 S.Ct, 29, 1905),
including school districts.

In answering the arguments of the defendants,

the Court stated:
If the legislature of the state has the power to create and alter
school districts, and divide and apportion the property of such
district, no contract can arise,
said to be taken,

no property of a district can be

and the action of the legislature is compatable

with a republican form of government . . . ." (Attorney General of
the State of Michigan ex rel. Kies v. Lowrev. 26 S.Ct. 29, 1905)

State of Montana ex rel. Haire v. Rice, 204 U.S. 291 (1907).

An act

approved by the United States Congress in 1889 admitted Montana and
several other states into the Union.

Among the provisions of this

enabling act was the granting of public lands to the state of Montana
solely for the purpose of public education.

The people of the territory

about to become a state were required to select delegates to a convention
charged with the responsibility of creating a state constitution and
government.
The state constitution approved at this constitutional convention
"in substance provided

that all funds of the state institutions of learning

should be invested and

only the interest upon them used for the support of
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those institutions . . . "
S.Ct. 284, 1907).

(State of Montana ex rel. Halre V. Rice. 27

In 1905 the state legislature authorized a bond issue

to subsidize an addition to the state's normal school building.

These

bonds were to be secured by proceeds from the sale, lease, or exploitation
of the lands that had been granted to Montana by the federal government
for the support of the schools.
When the architect of the building addition sought to be paid for
his services from the proceeds of the bond issue, the State Treasurer
refused to pay him claiming that the bond issue secured by proceeds from
the sale or lease of school lands was in violation of the state's
constitutional requirement that only earned interest be used to support
the schools of the state.

Litigation followed the State Treasurer's

refusal.
Affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court of Montana, the United
States Supreme Court declared the bond act invalid because it was in
violation of the Montana State Constitution.

The Tenth Amendment provides

that powers not specified as federal powers are reserved to the states.
One of the state's powers is its provision for public education.

The Court

determined that, in view of the Tenth Amendment, a state may properly
limit the way in which federal grants of land to the state for the purpose
of education may be used.

The requirement of Montana's Constitution that

only earned interest be expended in supporting the schools of the state
is, therefore, permissible.

Kramer V. Union Free School District Mo. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
section of the New York Education Law provided that in certain school

A
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districts residents, otherwise eligible to vote, were prohibited from
voting in school district elections if they did not own or lease taxable
real property or have children attending the local public schools.

A

bachelor who neither owned or leased taxable property challenged the
constitutionality of the section, arguing that it was counter to the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The school district

argued that the state had a legitimate compelling interest in limiting
the franchise in school district elections to those members of the
community "primarily interested" in or "primarily affected" by school
affairs.
The Supreme Court found the New York section to be a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.

Citing Williams v. Rhodes (1968), the Court

said:
In determining whether or riot a state law violates the Equal
Protection Clause, we must consider the facts and circumstances
behind the law, the interests which the State claims .to be
protecting, and the interest of those who are disadvantaged by
the classification. (Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15,
395 U.S. 626, 1969)
In the present case the Court decided that although the state of New York
did have a legitimate interest and the authority to enact laws relative
to the operation of public schools, those laws must not deny any citizen
of his constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Therefore, if a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to
some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies
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the franchise to others, the Court must determine whether the
exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.
(Kramer v. Union Free School District Mo. 15. 395 U.S. 627, 1969)
In this case the Court ruled that those exclusions were not "necessary to
promote a compelling state interest."
The court also stated that while New York legitimately might limit
the franchise to those "primarily interested in school affairs," the
classifications of the section of the New York Education in question here
t

did not accomplish that purpose "with sufficient precision to justify
denying appellant and members of his class, since the classifications
include many persons at best only remotely interested in school affairs
and exclude others directly interested" (Kramer v. Union Free School
District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 1969).

Turner v. Pouche. 396 U.S. 346 (1970).

Black residents of

Taliaferro County, Georgia brought action to challenge the constitutionality
of a statutory system used to .select juries and school boards.

The system

in question provided for a county, school board of five landowners, selected
by a grand jury, which in turn was chosen from a jury list compiled by six
county jury commissioners who were appointed by the state superior;court
judge of that district.

Although the population of Taliaferro County was

about sixty percent black and although all students attending the county's
two schools were black (all white students having transferred elsewhere),
all the school board members were white.

The complaint attacked Georgia's

constitutional and statutory provisions for school board selection as
contrary to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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The Supreme Court decreed that the requirement that members of
county school boards be landowners was unconstitutional because it denied
equal protection of the laws.

In the opinion of the Court,

the appellants and the members of their class do have a federal
constitutional right to be considered for public service without the
burden of invidious discriminatory disqualifications.

The State may

not deny to some the privilege of holding public office that it
extends to others on the basis of distinctions that violate federal
constitutional guarantees.

(Turner v. Fouche. 396 U.S. 362-363, 1970)

Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971).

The Constitution of West Virginia

and certain West Virginia statutes require sixty percent voter approval of
measures which incur bonded indebtedness or increase tax rates beyond
those established by the Constitution.

The school board of Roane County,

West Virginia, submitted to the voters of. that county a proposal calling
for the issuance of general obligation bonds for the purpose of
constructing new school buildings and improving existing facilities.

By

separate ballot, the voters were also asked to authorize the Board of
Education to levy additional taxes to support current expenditures and
capital improvements.

Both proposals were defeated because they failed

to obtain the required sixty percent approval.

Respondents sought to

have the sixty percent requirement declared unconstitutional as violative
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Even though West Virginia has made it more difficult for some kinds
of governmental actions to be taken,'" . . . there is nothing in the
language of the Constitution, our history, or our cases that requires that
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majority always prevail on every isBue" {Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 6*
1971)•

The Court concluded that "so long as such provisions do not

discriminate against or authorize discrimination against any identifiable
class they do not violate the Equal Protection Clause" (Gordon v. Lance.
403 U.S. 7, 1971).

Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 {1968).

In Mclnnls v. Oqilvic,

a precursor to the widely publicized Rodriquez case, the Court affirmed
the decision of the District Court upholding the constitutionality of a
state system of funding public schools that relies heavily on the local
property tax.

In the Mclnnis case, heard on the District Court level as

Mclnnls v. Shapiro (1968), a number of students from four school districts
of Cook County, Illinois, alleged that the Illinois system of financing
public education violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights of due
process and equal protection of the laws.

The students claimed that the

Illinois system permitted wide variations in the expenditures per student
from district to district, thereby providing some students with a better
education than others.
The Illinois legislature had delegated authority to local school
districts to raise funds to operate their schools by levying a tax on
property and by issuing bonds for construction and improvement of
buildings.

(Legislation also limits both the maximum indebtedness and

the maximum tax rates that school boards may impose.)

Because the

financial ability of individual districts varied substantially there was
a wide variation in district per-pupil expenditures.

However, a state
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common school fund guaranteed each district a foundation level of 400
dollars per pupil and thus provided a minimum level of education funding.
While admitting that there were, indeed, inequalities in per-pupil
expenditures from district to district, the District Court failed to
find the Illinois statutory system unconstitutional.

Failing to find the

wide variations in per-pupil expenditures to be irrational and arbitrary,
the District Court ruled that the system did not violate due process; and
failing to find that the system constituted an invidious discrimination,
the District Court held that the system did not deny the equal
protection of the laws to any class of students.
The District Court thus ruled that a state system for funding public
schools that relies largely on local property taxation is constitutional.
The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the lower court's decision by an
eight-to-one vote.

In ruling that the Illinois system did not violate

Fourteenth Amendment rights the District Court concluded its opinion as
follows:
The present Illinois scheme for financing public education reflects
a rational policy consistent with 'the mandate of the Illinois
Constitution.

Unequal educational expenditures per student, based

upon the variable property values and tax rates of local school
districts, do not amount to an invidious discrimination.

Moreover,

the statutes which permit these unequal expenditures on a district
to district basis are neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.
There is no-Constitutional requirement that public school expenditures
be made only on the basis of pupils' educational needs without regard
to the financial strength of local school districts.

Nor does the
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Constitution establish the rigid guideline of equal dollar
expenditures for each student. (Mclnnis v. Shapiro. 293 P. Supp.
336, 1968)

San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973).

The financing of public elementary and secondary schools in Texas

is based on mutual participation by state and local agencies.

Nearly half

of the revenues expended for education are derived from the state*s
Minimum Foundation Program which is designed to provide a basic minimum
education for all children in the state.

As a unit the school districts

in the state contribute twenty percent of the revenues for this program
which is then returned to the school districts under a formula designed
to have an equalizing influence on expenditure levels between school
districts.

Every school district in Texas supplements its state aid

through an ad valorem tax on property in its district.

This revenue

source varies with the value of taxable property in the district and
results in wide variations in per-pupil expenditures among school
districts.
Appellees brought this class action on behalf of school children
said to be members of poor families who reside in school districts
having a low property tax base, making the claim that the Texas
system's reliance on local property taxation favors the more
affluent and violates equal protection requirements because of
substantial interdistrict disparities in per-pupil expenditures
resulting primarily from differences in the value of assessable
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property among the districts. (San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriquez. 411 U.S. 1, 1973)
The United States Supreme Court has consistently maintained that the
Bjual Protection Clause requires "strict judicial scrutiny" of any
statute which operates to the disadvantage of any suspect class of persons
or interferes with the exercise of rights and liberties protected by the
Constitution.

The District Court found wealth to be a suspect

classification and education to be a fundamental right.

That court

concluded that the Texas system of funding education could be sustained
only if the state could show that its program was based on a "compelling
state interest."

When the state faiied to demonstrate a compelling

interest in its system of funding public education, the District Court
declared the Texas school finance system unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The state appealed to the

United States Supreme Court.
By a five-to-four margin, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the opinion of the District Court.

Finding neither the suspect-

classification nor the fundamehtal-interest arguments convincing, the
Supreme Court declared the Texas funding system permissible.
opinion of the Court:
class.

In the

"The Texas system does not disadvantage any suspect

It has not been shown to discriminate against any definable class

of 'poor1 people or to occasion discriminations depending on the relative
wealth of the families in any district" (San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 2, 1973).
Likewise, there was no loss of a fundamental right, as the appellees
claimed, because education is not constitutionally protected and since
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at least a minimum education is provided to each student in the state.
The question which the Supreme Court asked in evaluating the contention
that the Texas funding system denied a fundamental right wasr Does the
Constitution, either explicitly or implicitly, guarantee a right to
education?

The Court answered their question in this manner:

"Education,

of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our
Federal Constitution.

Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly

so protected" {San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez.
411 U.S. 35, 1973).

In its concluding remarks, the Court stated that the

Texas funding system was rationally related to a "legitimate state purpose
or interest" and therefore satisfied the standards of the Equal Protection
Clause.

Summary
To the extent that the number and the scope of cases involving
educational issues decided by the United States Supreme Court has increased
in the past thirty years, so has educators' need to know.

Various

authorities in the field of school law have expressed the opinion that
educators have failed to prepare themselves for the legal realities of
their profession.

McCarthy, Leipold and Rousch, Nolte, Hazard, Gatti and

Gatti, Van Geel, Simpson, and Campbell have all stated that ignorance
of the law is inexcusable and that measures need to be taken to rectify
the existing situation.
Five areas of Supreme Court decisions affecting education were
identified in this study:

student rights and responsibilities; employee

rights and responsibilities; church and state relationships; race,

language, and sex discrimination; and school district finance and
organization.

In each of these five areas, a number of United States

Supreme Court decisions were discussed.

Although the decisions discussed

in this review of literature are by no means exhaustive, it is presumed
that those presented do constitute a reasonable sampling of the decisions
about which those involved in education ought to be knowledgeable.

CHAPTER 3
Research Design and Procedures

Introduction
This chapter contains a description of the research design, the
selection of the sample, the instrument, and the procedures followed in
data collection and statistical analysis.

Research Design
The techniques of descriptive research, sometimes known as survey
research, were used in this study.

Descriptive research attempts to

systematically describe the facts and characteristics of a given
population (Isaac and Michael, 1990).

Descriptive research is concerned

with describing the prevailing conditions of relationships that exist.
It is mainly concerned with the present circumstances and not with past
or future conditions (Best, 1977).

In the present study the prevailing

condition under examination was the amount of knowledge of Supreme Court
decisions affecting education possessed by public school teachers,
principals, superintendents, and board members in Tennessee.
The specific type of descriptive research used in the present study
was survey testing.

Survey testing is defined as “simply the testing of

a group of children (or adults) to ascertain the prevailing condition
with respect to the traits measured by the test" (Good, Barr, and
Scates, 1941, p. 297).

Such testing is not concerned with the

characteristics of respondents individually but with the generalized
114
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statistics which result from study of the entire group (Good et al.,
1941 and Best, 1977).

Selection of the Sample
The purpose of this study was to determine the amount of knowledge
of United States Supreme Court decisions affecting education possessed
by public school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board members
in Tennessee; to determine if significant differences existed among these
groups in terms of their knowledge of Supreme Court decisions affecting
education; to determine if significant differences existed in the
knowledge of Supreme Court decisions among members of each group
depending on their years of experience in education; and to determine if
significant differences existed in the knowledge of Supreme Court
decisions among members of each group, depending on their level of
education.

In order to accomplish this purpose the four subgroups in

the sample were public school teachers, principals, superintendents, and
board members in Tennessee.

The technique of random sampling was used

to assure adequate representation of the population.

The population

consisted of the public school teachers, principals, superintendents, and
board members of public school districts in Tennessee.
Tennessee State Department of Education officials provided assistance
in selecting the sample of public school teachers, principals, and
superintendents.

Tennessee School Boards Association officials provided

assistance in selecting the sample of school board members surveyed in the
study.

One hundred principals, one hundred superintendents, one hundred
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board members, and two hundred teachers were randomly selected for
participation in the study.

Instrumentation

Development of the Instrument
The instrument. Supreme Court Decisions Impacting on Education
(Appendix C), was developed for the purpose of determining the amount of
knowledge of Supreme Court decisions affecting education possessed by
public school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board members.
The instrument was designed to elicit information concerning their
knowledge of the holdings of the United States Supreme Court.

The Supreme

Court Decisions Inpacting on Education instrument consisted of thirty-five
items.

Each of these items was identified as belonging to one of five

separate categories of Supreme Court decisions affecting education.
categories were as follows:

These

(1) student rights and responsibilities;

(2) employee rights and responsibilities; (3) church and state
relationships; (4} race, language, and sex discrimination; and (5) school
district finance and organization.
The Supreme Court Decisions Impacting on Education instrument asked
respondents to indicate whether the United States Supreme Court had
mandated ("must"), permitted ("may"), or prohibited ("must not") a
particular educational practice or procedure.

A fourth alternative was

provided ("don't know") for respondents who were unfamiliar with the
decision of the Court on a particular item.

These multiple-choice

statements were formulated on the basis of a review and analysis of the
literature.

Basic statements of decisions rendered by the Supreme Court
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were compiled into the survey instrument.

The format of the Supreme

Court Decisions Impacting on Education instrument was suggested by
Perry A. Zirkel (Zirkel, 1978a and 1978c).

Permission to use Zirkel1s

format was sought and received (see Appendix A).

Validation of the Instrument
The survey instrument was pilot tested by two groups of graduate
students at East Tennessee State University majoring in educational
administration and supervision during the summer of 1983.

Recommendations

concerning superfluous, inconsistent, or ambiguous statements were
solicited.

Recommendations and suggestions for improvement were

incorporated into the survey instrument.

By means of this pilot test,

the Supreme Court Decisions Impacting on Education instrument was accepted
as valid for the purposes of this study.

A copy of the survey instrument

is included in Appendix B.

Procedures

Data Collection
Once approval was granted by the advanced graduate committee to
pursue the study, the Supreme Court Decisions Impacting on Education
instrument was mailed to the randomly selected san%>le of public school
teachers, principals, superintendents, and board members.

Along with

the instrument each participant received a cover letter explaining the
procedures for completing the instrument (see Appendix C ].
confidentiality was assured.

Individual

A stamped, self-addressed envelope was

provided for the participant to return the completed instrument.

Four
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weeks after the initial mailing a follow-up letter was sent to those
subjects who had not responded (see Appendix D).

Four weeks later data

from the returned instruments were prepared for statistical analysis.

Statistical Analysis
For the purpose of statistical treatment the null farm of each
research hypothesis was tested.

The null hypothesis postulates that

there is no significant difference or relationship between the variables
under analysis (Popham and Sirotnik, 1973).

"The null hypothesis is a

succinct way to express the testing of obtained data against chance
expectations" (Kerlinger, 1973, p. 203).
One-way analysis of variance and the Newman-Keuls procedure were
the statistical techniques utilized in testing the hypotheses in this
study.

Analysis of variance is an inferential technique used to determine

if three or more means are significantly different.

Because analysis of

variance does not reveal where specific differences may lie among several
means, special post hoc tests are required (Champion, 1976).

In this

study the Newman-Keuls post hoc procedure was used to determine where
specific differences existed.

The .05 level of significance was used in

this study for determining statistical significance,.

CHAPTER 4
An Analysis of the Findings of the Study

Introduction
The purpose of this study was to determine the knowledge of United
States Supreme Court decisions affecting education possessed by public
school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board membersj to
determine if significant differences existed among these groups in terms
of their knowledge of Supreme court decisions affecting education; to
determine if significant differences existed in the knowledge of Supreme
Court decisions among members of each group, depending on their years of
experience in education; and to determine if significant differences
existed in the knowledge of Supreme Court decisions among members of each
group, depending on their level of education.

Fourteen hypotheses were

tested using the analysis of variance and Newman-Keuls procedures.

The

analysis of variance procedure indicated whether differences did, in fact,
exist; the Newman-Keuls procedure indicated where the identified

>

differences lay.- The null form of each of the fourteen hypotheses was
tested at the .05 level of significance.

Details of the findings are

presented in the following sections.

Analysis of the Findings
A total of 500 subjects was included in the san$>le which consisted
of two hundred teachers, one hundred principals, one hundred superintendents,
and one hundred school board members.
119

All subjects were affiliated with a
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public school system in the state of Tennessee.

Eighty-five teachers,

fifty-three principals, sixty-four superintendents, and thirty-nine
board members returned usable instruments.

A total of 241, or 48.2

percent, usable instruments were returned.

Table 1 presents the

preceding information in tabular form.

Table 1
Number and Percent of Returned Responses

Position

Number
Sent

Number
Returned

Percent

Teacher

200

85

42.5

Principal

100

53

53.0

Superintendent

100

64

64.0

Board Member

100

39

39.0

Total

500

241

.

48.2

There were seven questions on the survey instrument which were
designed to measure respondents' knowledge about Supreme Court decisions
affecting education in the area of student rights and responsibilities.
Means and standard deviations for the four groups and for the entire
sample in the area of Btudent rights and responsibilities are presented
in Table 2.

N
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Table 2
Keans and Standard Deviations for Respondents' Knowledge of
Supreme court Decisions in the Area of
Student Rights and Responsibilities

Standard
Deviation

Position

N

Mean

Teacher

85

3.3294

1.5227

Principal

53

3.8491

1.4464

Superintendent

64

4.1094

1.6438

Board Member

39

2.8462

1.3676

241

3.5726

1.5719

Entire Sample

Null Hypothesis 1
Null Hypothesis 1 states that there will be no significant difference
among public school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board
members in the knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court
decisions affecting education in the area of student rights and
responsibilities.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for
Null Hypothesis 1 are presented in Table 3.

The F ratio was 6.9737 with

F probability being 0.0002 which Was less than the .05 level of
significance.

Therefore, a significant difference was found, and the null

hypothesis was rejected.
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Table 3
Analysis of Variance for Respondents’ Knowledge of Supreme
Court Decisions in the Area of Student Rights and
Responsibilities

Source of
Variation

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Degrees of
Freedom

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

F
Ratio

48.0990

16.0330

6.9737

237

544.8802

2.2991

‘240

592.9793

3

F
Probability

.0002*

*P ^ .05
Since the analysis of variance procedure revealed that there was a
significant difference among the groups in the knowledge of Supremo Court
decisions in the area of student rights and responsibilities, further
analysis was conducted using the Newman-Keuls procedure.

Superintendents

scored significantly higher in the area of student rights and
responsibilities than teachers and board members.
significantly higher than board members.

Principals scored

No significant difference was

found between Superintendents and principals, between principals and
teachers, or between teachers and board members in the amount of knowledge
demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting
education in the area of student rights and responsibilities.
of the Newman-Keuls procedure are presented in Table 4.

Results
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Table 4
Means and Mean Differences Between Groups in Their Knowledge of
Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of
Student Rights and Responsibilities

Group

Group Means

Board Members

2.8462

Teachers

3.3294

Principal

3.8491

Superintendent

4.1094

Teacher

0.4832

GrouD Mean Differences
Principal
Superintendent

1.0029**

1.2632**

.5197

.7800*
.2603

*Significant at .05 level
** Significant at .01 level
There were eight questions on the survey instrument which were
designed to measure respondents' knowledge about Supreme Court decisions
affecting education in the area of employee rights and responsibilities.
Means and standard deviations for the four groups and for the entire
sample in the area of employee rights and responsibilities are presented
in Table 5.
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Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations for Respondents' Knowledge of
Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of
Employee Rights and Responsibilities

Position

N

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Teacher

85

3.9882

1.7694

Principal

53

4.6981

1.4621

Superintendent

64

4.7500

1.6330

Board Member

39

4.5641

1.7441

241

4.4398

1.6899

Entire Sample

Mull Hypothesis 2
Null Hypothesis 2 states that there will be no significant difference
among public school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board
members in the knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court
decisions affecting education in the area of employee rights and
responsibilities.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for
Null Hypothesis 2 are presented in Table 6.

The P ratio was 3.3185 with

the F probability being 0.0206 which waB less than the .05 level of
significance.

Therefore, a significant difference was found, and the null

hypothesis was rejected.
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Table 6
Analysis of Variance for Respondents' Knowledge of
Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of
Employee Rights and Responsibilities

Source of
Variation

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

* P

Degrees of
Freedom

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Square

F
Ratio

27.6298

9.2099

3.3185

■ 237

657.7478

2.7753

240

685.3776

3

F
Probability

.0206*

.05
Since the analysis of variance procedure revealed that there was a

significant difference among the groups in the knowledge of Supreme Court
decisions in the area of employee rights and responsibilities, further
analysis was conducted using the Newman-Keuls procedure.

Superintendents

and principals scored significantly higher in the area of employee rights
and responsiblilities than teachers.

No significant difference was found

between superintendents and principals, between superintendents and board
members, between principals and board members, or between board members
and teachers in the amount of knowledge demonstrated about United States
Supreme Court decisions affecting education in the area of employee
rights and responsibilities.
presented in Table 7.

Results of the Newman-Keuls procedure are
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Table 7
Means and Mean Differences Between Groups in Their Knowledge of
Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of
Employee Bights and Responsibilities

Group

Group Means

Teacher

3.9882

Board Member

4.5641

Principal

4.6981

Superintendent

4.7500

Group Mean. Differences
Board Member
Principal
Superintendent

0.5759

0.7099*

0.7618*

0.1340

0.1859
0.0519

^Significant at .05 level
There were seven questions on the survey instrument which were
designed to measure respondents’ knowledge about Supreme Court decisions
affecting education in the area of church and state relationships.

Means

and standard deviations for the four groups and for the entire sample in
the area of church and state relationships are presented in Table 8.
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Table 8
Moans and Standard Deviations for Respondents' Knowledge of
Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of
Church and State Relationships

Position

N

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Teacher

85

2.4588

1.2301

Principal

53

3.0189

1.3372

Superintendent

64

3.8906

1.5442

Board Member

39

2.1026

1.2311

241

2.9046

1.4900

Entire Sample

Null Hypothesis 3
Null Hypothesis 3 states that there will be no significant difference
among public school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board
members in the Knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court
decisions affecting education in the area of church and state relationships.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for Null
Hypothesis 3 are presented in Table 9.

The P ratio was 19.3653 with the F

probability being 0.0000 which was less than the .05 level of significance.
Therefore, a significant difference was found, and the null hypothesis was
rejected.
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Table 9
Analysis of Variance for Respondents' Knowledge of
Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of
Churtih and State Relationships

Source of
Variation

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

F
Ratio

3

104.8938

34.9646

19.3653

Within Groups

237

427.9111

1.8055

Total

240

Between Groups

Degrees of
Freedom

F
Probability

.0000*

*P Z- .05
Since the analysis of variance procedure revealed that there was a
significant difference among the groups in the knowledge of Supreme Court
decisions in the area of church and state relationships, further analysis
was conducted using the Newman-Keuls procedure.

Superintendents scored

significantly higher than teachers, principals, and board members.
Principals scored significantly higher than teachers and board members.
No significant difference was found between teachers and board members
in the amount of knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme
Court decisions affecting education in the area of church and state
relationships.
Table 10.

Results of the Newman-Keuls procedure are presented in
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Table 10
Means and Mean Differences Between Groups in Their Knowledge of
Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of
Church and State Relationships

Group Means

Teacher

Board Member

2.1026

0.3562

Teacher

2.4588

Principal

3.0189

Superintendent

3.6906

Group

Group Mean Differences
Superintendent
Principal

0.9163**

1.7880**

0.5601*

1.4318**
0.B717**

♦Significant at .05 level
♦♦Significant at ,01 level
There were eight questions on the survey instrument which were
designed to measure respondents' knowledge about Supreme Court decisions
affecting education in the area of race, language, and sex discrimination.
Means and standard deviations for the four groups and for the entire
sample in the area of race, language, and sex discrimination are presented
in Table 11.
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Table 11
Means and Standard Deviations for Respondents' Knowledge of
Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of
Race, Language, and Sex Discrimination

Standard
Deviation

Position

N

Mean

Teacher

85

3.9412

1.7617

Principal

53

4.4906

1.5016

Superintendent

64

4.5469

1.6896

Board Member

39

3.8462

1.8287

241

4.2075

1.7171

Entire Sample

Null Hypothesis 4
Null Hypothesis 4 states that there will be no significant difference
among public school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board
members in the knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court
decisions affecting education in the area of race, language, and sex
discrimination.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for Null
Hypothesis 4 are presented in Table 12.

The F ratio was 2.6229 with the

F probability being 0.0513 which was greater than the .05 level of
significance.

Therefore, a significant difference was not found.

hypothesis was not rejected.
at the .05 level.

Tho null

No two groups were significantly different
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Table 12
Analysis of Variance for Respondents' Knowledge of
Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of
Race, Language, and Sex Discrimination

Source of
Variation

Between Groups

Degrees of
Freedom

3

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

F
Ratio

22.7391

7.5797

2.6229

2.8898

Within Groups

237

684.0875

Total

240

707.6266

F
Probability

0.0513

P i.05
There were five questions on the survey instrument which were
designed to measure respondents' knowledge about Supreme Court decisions
affecting education in the area of school district finance and organization.
Means and standard deviations for the four groups and for the entire
sanple in the area of school district finance and organization are
presented in Table 13.
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Table 13
Means and Standard Deviations for Respondents' Knowledge of
Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of School
District Finance and Organization

Standard
Deviation

Position

N

Teacher

85

2.2941

1.3612

Principal

53

2.8491

1.1162

Superintendent

64

2.9531

1.4631

Board Member

39

2.7179

1.2763

Entire Sample

241

2.6598

1.3480

Mean

Null Hypothesis 5
Null Hypothesis 5 states that there will be no significant difference
among public school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board
members in the knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court
decisions affecting education in the area of school district finance and
organization.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for
Null Hypothesis 5 are presented in Table 14.

The F ratio was 3.5795

with the F probability being 0.0146 which was less than .05 level of
significance.

Therefore, a significant difference was found, and the null

hypothesis was rejected.
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Table 14
Analysis of Variance for Respondents' Knowledge of
Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of School
District Finance and Organization

Source of
Variation

Between Groups

Degrees of
Freedom

3

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

F
Ratio

F
Probability

18.9033

6.3011

3.5795

0.0146*

1.7603

Within Groups

237

417.1963

Total

240

436.0996

*P

.05

Since the analysis of variance procedure revealed that there was a
significant difference among the groups in the knowledge of Supreme court
decisions in the area of school district finance and organization, further
analysis was conducted using the Newman-Keuls procedure.
and principals scored significantly higher than teachers.

Superintendents
No significant

difference was found between superintendents and principals, between
superintendents and board members, between principals and board members,
or between board members and teachers in the amount of knowledge
demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting
education in the area of school district finance and organization.
of the Newman-Keuls procedure are presented in Table 15.

Results
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Table 15
Means and Mean Differences Between Groups in Their Knowledge of
Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of School
District Finance and Organization

Group

Group Means

Teacher

2.2941

Board Member

2.7179

Principal

2.B491

Superintendent

2.9531

Group Mean Differences
Board Member
Principal
Superintendent

0.4238

0.5550*

0.6950*

0.1312

0.2352
0.1040

*Significant at .05 level
There was a total of thirty-five questions on the Supreme Court
Decisions Impacting on Education instrument.

Means and standard deviations

for the four groups and for the entire sample are presented in Table 16.
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Table 16
Means and Standard Deviations for Respondents1
Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court
Decisions Affecting Education

Standard
Deviation

Position

N

Teacher

85

16.0118

5.1858

Principal

53

18.9057

4.5373

Superintendent

64

20.2500

5.3601

Board Member

39

16.0769

5.5221

Entire Sample

241

17.7842

5.4524

Mean

Null Hypothesis 6
Null Hypothesis 6 states that there will be no significant difference
among public school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board
members in the overall knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme
Court decisions affecting education.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for Null
Hypothesis 6 are presented in Table 17.

The F ratio was 10.4922 with the

F probability being 0.0000 which was less than the .05 level of
significance.

Therefore, a significant difference was found, and the null

hypothesis was rejected.
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Table 17
Analysis of Variance.for Respondents' Overall Knowledge
of Supreme Court Decisions Affecting Education

Source of
Variation

Between Groups

Degrees of
Freedom

3

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

F
Ratio

F
Probability

836;4943

278.8413

10.4922

.0000*

26.5750

within Groups

237

6298.2858

Total

240

7134.7801

*P

< .05
Since the analysis of variance procedure revealed that there was a

signigicant difference among the groups in the overall knowledge of Supreme
Court decisions affecting education* further analysis was conducted using
the Newman-Keuls procedure.

Superintendents scored significantly higher

than teachers and board members; principals scored significantly higher
than teachers and board members.

No significant difference was found

between superintendents and principals or between board members and
teachers in the overall knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme
Court decisions affecting education.
procedure are presented in Table 18.

Results of the Newman-Keuls
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Table IB
Means and Mean Differences Between Groups in Their
Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court
Decisions Affecting Education

Group

Group Means

Teacher

16.0118

Board Member

16.0769

Principal

18.9057

Superintendent

20.2500

Group Mean Differences
Board Member
Principal
Superintendent

0.0651

2.8939*

4.2383**

2.8288*

4.1731**
1.3443

♦Significant at .05 level
**Signifleant at .01 level
There was a total of eighty-five public school teachers who returned
a survey instrument.

Thirteen respondents indicated that they had from

one to five years of experience in education, twenty-three had from six
to ten years experience, twenty-four had from eleven to fifteen years
experience, seven had from sixteen to twenty years experience, and
eighteen had twenty-one or more years of experience in education.

Table 19

presents the means and standard deviations for the five experience levels
and for the entire teacher sample on the overall knowledge of Supreme
Court decisions affecting education.
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Table 19
Moans and Standard Deviations Cor tho Overall Knowledge of Supreme
Court Decisions Affecting Education Demonstrated by Teachers
with Differing Levels of Experience in Education

Years of
Experience

N

Standard
Deviation

1-5

13

16.5385

3.9710

6-10

23

16.6087

5.1499

11-15

24

17.0000

5.4133

16-20

7

14.4286

2.3705

21 +

18

14.1667

6.2521

Entire Teacher Sample

85

16.0118

5.1858

Mean

Null Hypothesis 7
Null Hypothesis 7 states that there will be no significant difference
in the amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions
affecting education demonstrated by public school teachers with one to
five, six to ten, eleven to fifteen, sixteen to twenty, and twenty-one
or more years of experience in education.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for
Null Hypothesis 7 are presented in Table 20.

The P ratio was 1.0636

with the F probability being 0.3801 which was greater than the .05
level of significance.

Therefore, a significant difference was not found,

and the null hypothesis was not rejected.
different at the .05 level.

No two groups were significantly
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Table 20
Analysis of Variance for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court
Decisions Affecting Education Demonstrated by Teachers
with Differing Levels of Experience in Education

Source of
Variation

Between Groups

Degrees of
Freedom

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

4

114.0649

28.5162

Within Groups

80

2144.9233

26.8115

Total

84

2258.9882

P

F
Ratio

1.0636

F
Probability

.3801

> .05
There was a total of fifty-throe public school principals who

returned a completed survey instrument.

Two respondents indicated that

they had from one to five years of experience in education, two had
from six to ten years experience, seven had from eleven to fifteen years
experience, twelve had from sixteen to twenty years experience, and
thirty had twenty-one or more years experience in education.

Table 21

presents the means and standard deviations for the five experience levels
and for the entire principal sample on the overall knowledge of Supreme
Court decisions affecting education.
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Table 21
Means and Standard Deviations for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme
Court Decisions Affecting Education Demonstrated by Principals
with Differing Levels of Experience in Education

Standard
Deviation

Years of
Experience

N

1-5

2

24.0000

5.6559

6-10

2

18.5000

2.1213

11-15

7

17.5714

2.9358

16-20

12

17,8333

3.5119

21 +

30

19.3333

5.1282

Entire Principal Sample

53

18.9057

4.5373

Mean

Null Hypothesis B
Null Hypothesis 8 states that there will be no significant difference
in the amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions
affecting education demonstrated by public school principals with one to
five, six to ten, eleven to fifteen, sixteen to twenty, and twenty-one or
more years of experience in education*
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for
Null Hypothesis 8 are presented in Table 22.

The F ratio was 1.0215 with

the F probability being .4058 which was greater than the .05 level of
significance.

Therefore, a significant difference was not found, and the

null hypothesis was not rejected.
different at the .05 level*

No two groups were significantly
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Table 22
Analysis of Variance for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme court
Decisions Affecting Education Demonstrated by Principals
with Differing Levels of Experience in Education

Source of
Variation

Between Groups

Degrees of
Freedom

Sum of
Squares

F
Ratio

Mean
Squares

4

83.9807

20.9952

Within Groups

48

986.5476

20.5531

Total

52

1070.5283

1.0215

F
Probability

.4058

P > .05
There was a total of sixty-four public school superintendents who
returned a completed survey instrument.

Twelve respondents indicated that

they had from eleven to fifteen years of experience in education, seven
had from sixteen to twenty years of experience, and forty-five had
twenty-one or more years of experience in education.

Hone of the

respondents had ten years, or less, experience in education.

Table 23

presents the means and standard deviations for the five experience levels
and for the entire superintendent sample on the overall knowledge of
Supreme Court decisions affecting education.
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Table 23
Means and Standard Deviations for the Overall Knowledge of Supremo Court
Decisions Affecting education Demonstrated by Superintendents
with Differing Levels of Experience of Education

Years of
Experience

N

1-5

0

6-10

0

Mean

Standard
Deviation

11-15

12

21.5000

4.2319

16-20

7

20.2657

6.5756

21 +

45

19.9111

5.4972

Entire Superintendent Sample

64

20.2500

5.3601

Hull Hypothesis 9
Hull Hypothesis 9 states that there will be no significant difference
in the amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions
affecting education demonstrated by public school superintendents with one
to five, six to ten, eleven to fifteen, sixteen to twenty, and twenty-one
or more years of experience in education.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for
Mull Hypothesis 9 are presented in Table 24.

The F ratio was 0.40S6

with the F probability being .6664 which was greater than the .05 level
of significance.

Therefore, a significant difference was not foundf and

the null hypothesis was not rejected.
different at the .05 level.

No two groups were significantly
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Table 24
Analysis of Variance for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme court Decisions
Affecting Education Demonstrated by Superintendents with
Differing Levels of Experience in Education

Source of
Variation

Sum of
Squares

Kean
Squares

F
Ratio

F
Probability

2

23.9270

11.9635

.4086

.6664

Within Groups

61

1786.0730

29.2799

Total

63

1810.0000

Between Groups

Degrees of
Freedom

I* > .05
There was a total of thirty-nine public school board members who
returned a completed survey instrument.

Twelve respondents indicated

that they had from one to five years of experience in education, ten had
from six to ten years of experience, seven had from eleven to fifteen
years of experience, four had from sixteen to twenty years of experience,
and six had twenty-one or more years of experience in education.

Table 25

presents the means and standard deviations for the five experience levels
and for the entire school board sample on the overall knowledge of Supreme
Court decisions affecting education.
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Table 25
Means and Standard Deviations for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court
Decisions Affecting Education Demonstrated by Board Members
with Differing Levels of Experience in Education

Years of
Experience

N

Mean

Standard
Deviation

1-5

12

17.2500

6.1515

6-10

10

14.2000

6.1608

11-15

7

17.0000

4.3205

16-20

4

14.0000

5.3541

21 +

6

17.1667

4.9160

39

16.0769

5.5221

Entire Board Member Sample

Null Hypothesis 10
Null Hypothesis 10 states that there will be no significant difference
in the amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions
affecting education demonstrated by public school board members with one
to five, six to ten, eleven to fifteen, sixteen to twenty, and twenty-one
or more years of experience in education.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for
Null Hypothesis 10 are presented in Table 26.

The F ratio waB 0.6480 with

the F probability being .6321 which was greater than the .05 level of
significance.

Therefore, a significant difference was not found, and the

null hypothesis was not rejected.
different at the .05 level.

No two groups were significantly
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Table 26
Analysis of Variance for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court
Decisions Affecting Education Demonstrated by Board Members
with Differing Levels of Experience in Education

Source of
Variation

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

F
Patio

4

82.0859

20.5215

.6480

Within Groups

34

1076.6833

31.6672

Total

38

1158.7692

Between Groups

Degrees of
Freedom

F
Probability

.6321

P >.05
There was a total of eighty-five public school teachers who returned
a completed survey instrument.

One respondent indicated that he was a

high school graduate, forty-one had the baccalaureate degree, twenty-one
had a master's degree, eighteen had a master's degree plus additional
course work, and four had the education specialist degree.
received the doctorate degree.

None had

Table 27 presents the means and standard

deviations for the six education levels and for the entire teacher sample.
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Table 27
Means and Standard Deviations for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court
Decisions Affecting Education Demonstrated by Teachers
with Differing Levels of Educational Attainment

Highest Level
of Education

N

Mean

High School Graduate

1

7.0000

0.0000

Baccalaureate Degree

41

14.9268

5.2839

Master's Degree

21

17.3810

4.8008

Master's Plus

18

16.8333

5.1933

Education Specialist Degree

4

18.5000

2.3805

Doctoral Degree

0
16.0118

5.1858

Entire Teacher Sample

85

Standard
Deviation

Hull Hypothesis 11
Null Hypothesis 11 states that there will be no significant difference
in the amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions
affecting education demonstrated by public school teachers with a high
school diploma, a baccalaureate degree, a Master's degree, a Master's
degree plus additional coursework, an Education Specialist's degree, and
a doctoral degree.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for Hull
Hypothesis 11 are presented in Table 2B.

The F ratio was 2.0042 with the

F probability being .1018 which was greater than the .05 level of
significance.

Therefore, a significant difference was not found, and the
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null hypothesis was not rejected.

Ho two groups were significantly

different at the .05 level.

Table 26
Analysis of Variance for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court
Decisions Affecting Education Demonstrated by Teachers with
Differing Levels of Educational Attainment

Source of
Variance

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

F
Ratio

4

205.7554

51.4388

2.0042

Within Groups

80

2053.2329

25.6654

Total

84

2258.9BB2

Between Groups

Degrees of
Freedom

F
Probability

.1018

PjS> .05
There was a total of fifty-three public school principals who
returned a completed survey instrument.

One respondent indicated that

he had received a baccalaureate degree, nine had a master's degree, thirty
had a master's degree plus additional coursework, nine had the education
specialist degree, and four had received the doctoral degree.

Table 29

presents the means and standard deviations for the six education levels
and for the entire principal sample.
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Table 29
Means and Standard Deviations for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court
Decisions Affecting Education Demonstrated by Principals
with Differing Levels of Educational Attainment

Highest Level
of Education

N

High School Graduate

0

Baccalaureate Degree
Master's Degree

Mean

Standard
Deviation

1

21.0000

0.0000

9

20.7778

3.5277

30

19.4333

3.9973

Education Specialist Degree

9

16.2222

6.4183

Doctoral Degree

4

16.2500

3.6856

53

18.9057

4.5373

Master's Plus

Entire Principal Sanple

Mull Hypothesis 12
Null Hypothesis 12 states that there will be no significant difference
in the amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions
affecting education demonstrated by public school principals with a high
school diploma, a baccalaureate degree, a Master's degree, a Master's
degree plus additional coursework, an Education Specialist's degree, and
a doctoral degree.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for Null
Hypothesis 12 are presented in Table 30.

The F ratio was 1.7655 with the

F probability being .1513 which was greater than the .05 level of
significance.

Therefore, a significant difference was not found, and the
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null hypothesis was not rejected.

No two groups were significantly

different at the .05 level.

Table 30
Analysis of Variance for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court
Decisions Affecting Education Demonstrated by Principals
with Differing Levels of Educational Attainment

Source of
Variation

Degrees of
Freedom

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

4

137.3005

34.3251

Within Groups

48

933.2278

19.4422

Total

52

1070.5283

Between Groups

F
Ratio

1.7655

F
Probability

.1513

P 2k .05
There was a total of sixty-four public school superintendents who
returned a completed survey instrument.

Thirteen respondents indicated

that they had attained a master's degree, twenty-five had a master's
degree plus additional coursework, twelve had the education specialist
degree, and fourteen had received the doctoral degree.

Table 31 presents

the means and standard deviations for the six education levels and for
the entire superintendent sample.
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Table 31
Means and Standard Deviations for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court
Decisions Affecting Education Demonstrated by Superintendents
with Differing Levels of Educational Attainment

Highest Level
of Education

N

High School Graduate

0

Baccalaureate Degree

0

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Master's Degree

13

16.4615

4.8065

Master's Plus

25

21.6400

3.1075

Education Specialist Degree

12

17.9167

7.0641

Doctoral Degree

14

23.2857

4.9835

Entire Superintendent Sample

64

20.2500

5.3601

Null Hypothesis 13
Null Hypothesis 13 states that there will be no significant difference
in the amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions'
affecting education demonstrated by public school superintendents with a
high school diploma, a baccalaureate degree, a Master's degree, a Master's
degree plus additional coursework, an Educational Specialist's degree, and
a doctoral degree.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for
Null Hypothesis 13 are presented in Table 32.

The F ratio was 6.2174

with the F probability being .0010 which was less than the .05 level of
significance.

Therefore, a significant difference was found, and the null

hypothesis was rejected.
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Table 32
Analysis of Variance for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court Decisions
Affecting Education Demonstrated by Superintendents with
Differing Levels of Educational Attainment

Degrees of
Freedom

Source of
Variation

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

3

429.2354

143.0785

Within Groups

60

1360.7646

23.0127

Total

63

1810.0000

Between Groups

F
Ratio

F
Probability

6.2174

.0010*

*P ^ .05
Since the analysis of variance procedure revealed that there was a
significant difference among superintendents with differing levels of
educational attainment in their knowledge of Supreme Court decisions
affecting education, further analysis was conducted using the Newman-Keuls
procedure.

This analysis indicated that superintendents with a Master's

degree plus additional course work and superintendents with a doctoral
degree scored significantly higher than superintendents with a Master's
degree and superintendents with an Education Specialist's degree.
of the Newman-Keuls procedure are presented in Table 33.

Results
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Table 33
Means and Mean Differences Between Superintendents with Differing
Levels of Educational Attainment in Their Knowledqe of
Supreme Court Decisions Affecting Education

Highest Level
of Education

Master’s Degree

Group Means

16.4615

Group Mean Differences
Doctorate
Education
Master's
Plus
Specialist

1.4552

Education Specialist 17.9167
Master's Plus

21.6400

Doctoral Degree

23.2B57

5.1785*

6.8242**

3.7233*

5.3690**
1.6457

♦Significant at .05 level
♦♦Significant at .01 level
There was a total of thirty-nine public school board members who
returned a completed survey instrument.

Sixteen respondents indicated

that they were high school graduates, seventeen had received a
baccalaureate degree, two had a master's degree, two had a master's degree
plus additional course work, and two had received the doctoral degree.
Table 34 presents the means and standard deviations for the six
education levels and for the entire board member sample.
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Table 34
Means and Standard Deviations for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court
Decisions Affecting Education Demonstrated by Board Members
with Differing Levels of Educational Attainment

Highest Level
of Education

N

High School Graduate
Baccalaureate Degree

Mean

Standard
Deviation

16

15.6250

5.3650

17

15.8235

6.1363

Master's Degree

2

18.0000

1.4142

Master's Plus

2

14.0000

5.6569

Education Specialist Degree

0

Doctoral Degree

2

22.0000

0.0000

39

16.0769

5.5221

Entire Board Member Sample

Hull Hypothesis 14
Hull Hypothesis 14 states that there will be no significant difference
in the amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions
affecting education demonstrated by public school board members with a
high school diploma, a baccalaureate degree, a Master's degree, a Master's
degree plus additional coursework, an Education Specialist's degree, and
a doctoral degree.
The results of the analysis of variance statistical procedure for Null
Hypothesis 14 are presented in Table 35.

The F ratio was 0.7215 with the

F probability being .5639 which was greater than the .05 level of
significance.

Therefore, a significant difference was not found, and the
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null hypothesis was not rejected.

No two groups were significantly

different at the .05 level.

Table 35
Analysis of Variance for the Overall Knowledge of Supreme Court Decisions
Affecting Education Demonstrated by Board Members with
Differing Levels of Educational Attainment

Source of
Variation

Degrees of
Freedom

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

4

90.5486

22.6372

Within Groups

34

1068.2206

31.4183

Total

38

1158.7692

Between Groups

F
Ratio

F
Probability

.7205

.5839

P > .05

Summary
The purpose of this study was to determine the knowledge of United
States Supreme Court decisions affecting education possessed by public
school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board members.

Fourteen

null hypotheses were formulated and tested at the .05 level of statistical
significance using the analysis of variance.

The Newman-Keuls statistical

procedure was conducted if significant differences were revealed.

This

latter procedure was performed to determine where significant differences
lay.

Data were analyzed for 241 respondents.
The first six hypotheses were formulated and tested to determine if

significant differences existed among the four groups in terms of their
knowledge of Supreme Court decisions affecting education.

Five areas and

XS5

the total knowledge of Supreme Court decisions affecting education were
identified and tested.

Significant differences were found to exist among

the four groups in all areas except in the area of race, language, and
sex discrimination cases.

Significant differences were found among the

four groups in the overall knowledge of Supreme Court decisions affecting
education.

Therefore, null hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 were rejected;

null hypothesis 4 was not rejected.
Hypotheses 7, 8, 9, and 10 were formulated and tested to determine
if significant differences existed in the knowledge of Supreme Court
decisions among members of each group depending on their years of
experience in education.

No significant differences were found among the

members of any of the four groups.

The null hypotheses were not rejected.

Hypotheses 11, 12, 13, and 14 were formulated and tested to determine
if significant differences existed in the knowledge of Supreme Court
decisions among members of each group depending on their level of
education.

No significant differences were found among the members of the

teacher, principal, and board member samples.
hypotheses 11, 12, and 14 were not rejected.

Therefore, the null
Significant differences

were found among superintendents with differing levels of educational
attainment; null hypothesis 13 was rejected.

CHAPTER 5
Summary and Recotnnendations

Summary
The primary purpose of this study was to determine the knowledge of
United States Supreme Court decisions affecting education possessed by
public school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board members.
Survey instruments were mailed to two hundred teachers, one hundred
principals, one hundred superintendents, and one hundred board members
in the public school systems of Tennessee.
out four weeks after initial mailing.

A follow-up mailing was sent

Eighty-five teachers, fifty-three

principals, sixty-four superintendents, and thirty-nine board members
returned usable instruments.

This total of 241 responses represented

48.2 percent of the sample.
Specifically, this study compared knowledge of Supreme Court decisions
affecting education in three ways.

First, six hypotheses wore formulated

to determine if significant differences existed among public school
teachers, principals, superintendents, and board members in their
knowledge of Supreme Court decisions affecting education.

Five of these

hypotheses were concerned with specific areas of school governance.

The

Bixth hypothesis was concerned with the overall knowledge of Supreme
Court decisions affecting education.
Second, four hypotheses were formulated to determine if significant
differences existed in the knowledge of Supreme court decisions affecting
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education among members of each group* depending on respondents' years
of experience in education.

Third* four hypotheses were formulated to

determine if significant differences existed in the knowledge of Supreme
Court decisions affecting education among members of each group* dependent
on respondents' level of education.
The fourteen null hypotheses were formulated to be tested at the
.05 level of significance.

The analysis of variance statistical procedure

was used as the first step in data analysis.

This procedure yielded an

F ratio and an F probability which indicated whether a significant
difference existed.

If a significant difference was revealed* the Newman-

Keuls procedure was used to determine where specific differences occurred.
Significant differences were revealed in six of the fourteen
hypotheses tested.

Thus* the null hypothesis was rejected for hypotheses

1* 2, 3* 5* 6* and 13.
The mean score of 17.7842 for the entire sample on the thirty-five
item instrument suggested a deficiency in the preservice and in-service
training of individuals involved in education.

Although significant

differences were found among groups* mean scores for the four groups
revealed a general lack of knowledge in the overall knowledge of Supreme
Court decisions affecting education.
There was a significant difference among groups in the knowledge
demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting
education in the area of student rights and responsibilities.
Superintendents scored significantly higher than teachers and board
members on this section of the survey instrument, and principals scored
significantly higher than board members.

No significant difference was
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found between superintendents and principals, between principals and
teachers, or between teachers and board members in the amount of knowledge
demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting
education in the area of student rights and responsibilities.
There was a significant difference among groups in the knowledge
demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting
education in the area of employee rights and responsibilities.
Superintendents and principals scored significantly higher than teachers
on this section of the survey instrument.

No significant difference was

found between superintendents and principals, between superintendents
and board members, between principals and board members, or between
board members and teachers in the amount of knowledge demonstrated about
United States Supreme Court decisions affecting education in the area of
employee rights and responsibilities.
There was a significant difference among groups in the knowledge
demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting
education in the area of church and state relationships.

Superintendents

scored significantly higher than teachers, principals, and board members
on this section of the survey instrument.

Principals scored

significantly higher than teachers and board members.

No significant

difference was found between teachers and board members in the amount
of knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions
affecting education in the area of church and state relationships.
There was no significant difference among groups in the knowledge
demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting
education in the area of race, language, and sex discrimination.

159
There was a significant difference among groups in the knowledge
demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting
education in the area of school district finance and organization.
Superintendents and principals scored significantly higher than teachers
on this section of the survey instrument.

No significant difference was

found between superintendents and principals, between superintendents
and board members, between principals and board members, or between board
members and teachers in the amount of knowledge demonstrated about United
States Supreme Court decisions affecting education in the area of school
district finance and organization.
There was a significant difference among groups in the overall
knowledge demonstrated about United States Supreme Court decisions
affecting education.

Superintendents scored significantly higher than

teachers and board members on the survey instrument.
significantly higher than teachers and board members.

Principals scored
No significant

difference was found between superintendents and principals or between
board members and teachers in the overall knowledge demonstrated about
United States Supreme Court decisions affecting education.
The number of years of experience in education did not significantly
affect the amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions
affecting education demonstrated by teachers.
The number of years of experience in education did not significantly
affect the amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions
affecting education demonstrated by principals.
The number of years of experience in education did not significantly
affect the amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions
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affecting education demonstrated by superintendents.
The number of years of experience in education did not significantly
affect the amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions
affecting education demonstrated by board members*
The level of education attained did not significantly affect the
amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting
education demonstrated by teachers.
The level of education attained did not significantly affect the
amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting
education demonstrated by principals.
The level of education attained significantly affected the amount of
knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting education
demonstrated by superintendents*

Superintendents with a Master's degree

plus additional coursework and superintendents with a doctoral degree
scored significantly higher than superintendents with a Master's degree
and superintendents with an Education Specialist's degree.
The level of education attained did not significantly affect the
amount of knowledge about United States Supreme Court decisions affecting
education demonstrated by board members*

Recotimendatlons
One may conclude from the results of this survey that the
superintendents and principals surveyed possess more knowledge of
United States Supreme Court decisions affecting education than do board
members or teachers*

Except in the area of race, language, and sex

discrimination, superintendents scored significantly higher than teachers.
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Except in the areas of race, language, and Bex discrimination and
student rights and responsibilities, principals scored significantly
higher than teachers.

Superintendents and principals scored significantly

higher than board members in the areas of student rights and
responsibilities, church and state relationships, and overall knowledge.
In four of the five sections of the survey, superintendents had the
highest score, and principals had the second-highest score.

The sole

exception was the area of race, language, and sex discrimination, in
which principals scored slightly higher than superintendents.

For the

entire survey, superintendents and principals scored significantly
higher than teachers and board members.

An analysis of the findings

of this survey led to the conclusion that administrators are better
equipped to make the decisions that comply with the laws affecting
education.

Thus, the responsibilities delegated to superintendents and

principals seem to be rightly placed.
However, the low scores of all groups surveyed indicated a general
lack of preparation in the area of school law.

The fact that the mean

score of the entire sample was 17.7842 on a thirty-five item test
indicated a deficiency in thiB area.
As a result of the findings of this study, the following
recoirenendations were proposed:
1.

College and university teacher-education programs should be

evaluated in terms of the preservice preparation of teachers in the area
of school law, including Supreme Court decisions affecting education.
2.

Graduate programs in educational administration should be

evaluated in terms of their preparation of principals and superintendents
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in the area of school law, including Supreme Court decisions affecting
education.
3.

State and national school board associations should evaluate

their preparation of school board members in the area of school law,
including Supreme Court decisions affecting education.
4.

State and local school districts and school board associations

should seek to provide appropriate in-service programs to keep their
personnel informed of pertinent matters of school law, including
Supreme Court decisions affecting education.
5.

A study of this nature should be conducted in other states,

in specific geographic regions, or in a nationwide study.
6.

Because of the ever-changing nature of the law and of the

Court's interpretation of the law, studies of this nature should be
conducted periodically.
7.

The present study examined education levels and levels of

experience in education as factors in knowledge of Supreme Court
decisions affecting education.

Future studies of this type might

consider other factors such as sex differences, regional differences,
recency of course work in school law, or size of school district.
8 . Future studies of this type might incorporate a different
set of test items to measure knowledge of Supreme Court decisions
affecting education.

For example, other studies might include questions

pertaining solely to higher education.
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(215) 861*3221

S C H O O L O F EDUCATION

Office of the D e a n

July 14, 1982

William P. Abegglen
2403 Hufflne Circle
Johnson City, TN 37601
Dear Mr. Abegglen:
You hereby have my permission to use my C0URTS-SCH00LS Instrument or
an abbreviated version thereof for your dissertation study with the under
standing that the source will be appropriately acknowledged and that you
send me a courtesy copy of your abstract upon completing the study.
Citations of articles in which 1 used this Instrument or a similar
technique are:
Zirkel, P. "Test on Supreme Court decisions affecting education.
Kappan. 1978, 59, 521-2.

Phi Delta

Zirkel, P. A quiz on recent court decisions concerning student conduct.
Delta Kappan. 1980, 6 2 , 206-208.

Phi

Zirkel, P. 6 Metzger, M. Special education: A quick quiz to keep up-to-date.
School Administrator, 1981, 30 (9), 20-21.
Zirkel, P.

Test your legal savvy.

Instructor, 1982, 91 (7), 54-55, 129.

Zirkel, P. Outcomes analysis of court decisions concerning faculty employment.
NOLPE School Law Journal. 10 (2), 171-183.
I do not have any printed copies of the instrumentleft, but it Is largely
contained in NOLPE School Law Journal, 1978, 7_t 199-208. Also, the book
summarizing the decisions Is A Digest of Supreme Court Decisions Affecting
Education. Bloomington, Indiana: Phi Delta Kappa, 1978 (and 1982 Supplement).
Sincerely,

Zirkel
Dean and Professor
PAZ:ej
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S U PR E M E COURT DECISIONS IMPACTING ON EDUCATION
INSTRUCTIONS:PleasepUcejn * ononealIhelullthreelinestielewlaindicatewhetherIM UnitedStiltsSupremeCoutlhasheldthe
practiceotproceduredescribedlabe mandatory("MUSI"), permissible("MAY"),orprohibited{'‘MUST HOT") Use11m fourthlineil
youdaniknow whal iheCourtlusruled
STUDENT RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
1. Schoololkiils
begrantedimmunilyIromliabilitylordamageswhentheycanshowtheylureusednonmabciouiand
“good lailh"actionstoluililitheiroilicialduties.
Don‘1know______
Musi_____ May____ _ Musinai
2. School otlictais_____ gram thesame doeprocess procedurelojuvenilesaswouldbegivento adults.
Musi_____ May_____ Muiinni.... Don'tknow________
3. School otlicials_____ requiresiudenistoparticipateIndailyHag saluteexercises.
Musi
May
Mustnot______ Don'i_know______
4. School ollictais_____ allowpupilsloweararmbands,picketpeacelully,distributepublications,orotherwise expresstheir
beliefswhen suchmeans olexpressiondonotdisruptorInterferewilhschoolaclMlles.
Musi_____ May_____ Musinot______ Don't_know______
5. Schoolollidais______ provideoralorwrittennoticeandanInformalhearingpriorlosuspensionslorperiodsOluplotendays
lorsiudeniswhose presencedoes nolposean immediatethreatlopersons,properly,ortheacademicprocess.
Mull
May
Musinnl
Don‘1krww
6. Schoolollidais______ usereasonablecorporalpunishmentoIsiudenisunderiheauthorizationolorIntheabsenceolstatelaw
regardingIheuseolcorporalpunishment.
Musi
May
Musinol______ Oon'l_know______
7. Aschooldistrict_____ require,underauthorizationolastatesialuleorundercompulsionollocalordinance,vaccination asa
conditionolschoolattendance.
Musi
May
Musinol______ Don't_know______

EMPLOYEE RIGHTSAND RESPONSIBILITIES
S. A schooldisKiel_____ requireteachersorotherschoolemployeeslolakeabroadloyaltyoalhasarequisiteotemployment.
Mmi
May
Mustnol______ Don'iknow_______
9. A schooldistrid______ dismissateacherlorrefusingtoanswerquestionswhichareunrelatedloaninquiryintotheteacher's
Illnesstoteach.
Musi
May
Mustnol______ Don’t know______
10. A schooldistrict
impostaruleestablishingcontractnorvenewalasthesanctionlor(alluretocomplywilhacontinuing
educationrequirement.
Must
May
Mustnol______ Don't know______
11. A schooldislrict______ dismissa teacherloropenlycriticizingiheschoolboard'soradministration'spoifdtson Issuesol
publicimportancewhen iheboardcannotproveknowingorrecklesslalsltyoltheteacher'sstatement.
Must
May
Mustnol______ Don't know______
12. A schooldistrict
requireitsemployeesloresideInIheschooldislrtclasaconditionolInitialorcontinuedemployment.
Must_____ May_____Mustnol_______Don'tknow------13.A state______ allowitsschooldislrictstohavecontractualarrangementslornonprolesslonalslat!membersthatarenotIncon*
lormilywiththeminimum-satary,maximum-hourprovisionsoltheFederalFairLaborStandardsAct,
Musi_____ May_____Musinol_______ Oon'lknow______
14. A schooldistrict______ dismissIescherswhoareengagedinanillegalstrikewheniheteachersdonolshowthatIheboard's
decisionwasbasedon personal,pecuniary,orantiunionbias.
Musi
May_____Mustnol_______ Oon'lknow______
15. A stale______ allowHsschooldistrictstoenterintoaedlecUvebargainingagreementthathasan "agencyshop" provision
(i.e..arequirementlhalnonunionemployeespayaservicelealorexpensesrelatinglotheunion'scollectivebargainingfunction).
Musi
May
Musinol______ Don’tknow______
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CHURCH AND STATE RELATIONSHIPS
16 Schoolofficials
AllowonexemptionIroncompulsoryhighschoolaltendancelorstudentsatlilialedwilhreligioussetts
inn luvta longhistoryolinlormaivocationaltrainingduringiheAdolescentyears
Musi
May
Musinol______ Don'I know______
17 A schooldislnct______ providelorcomparableservicestoparochialschoolpupilsInitsplanlorspendingfederalCnauierI
(formerly"lineI")funds.
Must_____ May
Mustnol
Don'tknow______
18. Schoolofficials
allowlot"releasedtime" lorreligiousinslrucuonotpupilsduringschoolhoursoutsidetheschool
building.
Must_____May
Mustnol______ Oon'lknow______
19. A state______ provideforthelendingolapprovedsecularleilbooksfree-of-chargelononpubkcschoolchildren.
Musi
May_____ Mustnol
Oon'lknow
20 A stale______ providefoereimbursementolbustransportationcostsloparentsolchildrenattendingparochialschools.
Musi_____May_____ Musinot_______Oon'lknow______
21. A schooldisiricf______ hiveaprogramrequiringIhedailyreclUUonofanondenomlnatianalprayerinschoolunderthesuper
visionolschoolpersonnel
Must_____ May_____ Mustnot_______ Oon'lknow______
22. A schooldistrict______requiretheregularreadingolBiblicalpassagesunderthesupervisionolschoolpersonnel.
Muitnol_______ Don'tknow______
Musi_____ May
RACE, LANGUAGE, AND SEX DISCRIMINATION
23. A schooldistrict______ operatesingle-seaschoolswhen such a schoolIsvoluntary,when coeducationalalternativesare
available,andwhen educabonalopportunitiesolleredatIheschoolsformalesandfemalesarecomparable.
Musi
May
Musinot______ Don'tknow______
21. Private,nonseetarianschools______ otteradmissionloquallliedApplicantssolelyon Ihebasisolrace.
Must_
May
Muitnot
Oon'l know
25. A schooldistrict______ implementaplanlordesegregationInwhichastudentmayvoluntarilytransfertramaschoolwhere
he/sheisIniheracialmmonlytoaschoololhis/herownracialcomposition.
Must
May
Mustnot
Oon'l know
26. A school district'sdesegregationproposal
..._ includeimplementationolmathematical ratioslorIhedesegregaitonol
studenlsand faculty.
Musi
May
Musinot______ Don’tknow______
27. A schooldinners desegregationproposal______ includeaprovisionlorIhebusingolstudentstoaschoolwhichisnotthe
closestschooltothesiudenis'homes.
Must_____May_____ Mustnot_______ Oon'l know______
2B, A schooldistrict______ granttucreditsorotherstalelinanciatassistance(e.g.,treetextbooks,tulliongrants) lostudentsol
raciallysegregatedprivateschools.
Must
May
Musinol_______Don’tknow______
29. A schooldistrict______ havemandatorymaternityleaverulesitulrequireexpectantteacherstolakealeaveolabsenceIroma
speciliedtimebeforetoaspecifiedlimeafterIheexpecteddateolbinh.
Don’tknow______
Must_____May_____ Musinor
3G A schooldislrici_„_____ providespeciallanguage-basedInstructionlorlimitedEnglish-speakingpupils.
Must_____May______ Mustnol_______Don’tknow______
SCHOOL DISTRICTFINANCEAND ORGANIZATION
3t A stale
.. limitthewayinwhichlederalgramsollandmaybeusidwhengiventoIhestateforthepurposeolsupporling
educaiion(e.g.,requiringthatsuchassetsml bespentand thaionlyearnedInterestbeexpended lortherequiredpurposei
Must
May
Musinot______ Don'tknow______
32 A schooldislrici______ haveafundingsystemthatrelieslargelyonthelocalproperlylaxwhenthatschooldistrictottersat
lusta minimum educationloalpupilswithoutdiscriminatingagainstany rocogniteddisadvantagedgroupolthem
Must____ May
Mustnol_______ Oon'lknow______
33 A schooldstrict.
limitIherightlovoteinschoolboardelectionstoresidentswhoeitherowntaxablerealpropertyatna»e
childrenwhoaresiudenisIntheschooTdistricl.
Musr
May
Mustnut
Oon’lknow______
34. A schooldislrici______ havearequirementlhalmembersolIheboardoleducationbelandowners.
Must
May
Mustnol_______Don'tknow______
35 A schooldrsiriet______haveastatutoryprocedurewhichrequiresratilieationbysixtypercentratherthanbyasimplemajority
ofthevotesinareferendumelectionlorbonaissueapprovaloraddilfonaltaxation.
Must
May
Mustnot_______Don’tknow------
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PERSONAL DATA

A.

Position 1n which you serve:
Teacher
Principal _ _ _ ________ „
Superintendent ____________
Board Member

B.

__________

Sex:
M ale________
Female______

C.

Years o f experience In education:

1 - 5 _______
6 -1 0

_

11 - 15 _______
16 - 20 _______
21 +
D.

_______

Highest lev el o f formal education:
High school graduate ____________
Baccalaureate degree ____________
Master's d e g r e e _______ ___________
Master's plus ___________________
Education S p e c i a l i s t ^ __________
Doctorate _______________________
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East Tennessee Slate University
D e p a rtm e n ta l Supervision a n d A dm inistration • Bov 19000 A • Johnson City, T ennessee 37614*0002 • (615)929*4415,4430

November 26, 1984

William P. Abegglen
Department of Supervision
and Administration
East Tennessee State University
Box 19,OOOA
Johnson City, Tennessee 37614
Dear Colleaguet
1 am a doctoral candidate in the Department of Supervision and
Administration at East Tennessee State University. My dissertation is
entitled "A Survey to Determine Knowledge of United States Supreme Court
Decisions Affecting Education Possessed by Public School Teachers,
Administrators, and Board Members."
This study will attempt to determine the knowledge of United States
Supreme Court decisions affecting education possessed by public school
teachers, administrators, and board members; to determine if significant
differences exist among respondents when classified accordinq to number
of years experience in education and level of education.
The successful completion of this study depends on your willingness
to respond to the enclosed survey instrument. Your assistance will be
deeply appreciated. Will you take a few minutes of your busy day to com
plete the enclosed form and return it in the enclosed stamped evelope.
Responses will be reported by group totals only. You can be assured
that the information you provide will be kept strictly confidential and
that no individual will be identified in any way in this study. You will
notice a code number on the enclosed instrument. This code number will
be used only to facilitate follow-up techniques and will not be used to
identify respondents.
Please return the completed instrument at your earliest convenience.
Allow me to thank you in advance for your assistance in conducting this,
study.
Sincerely yours,

William P. Abegglen
Doctoral Candidate
WPAtchc
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East Tennessee State University
D epartm ent of S uperviiton a n d A dm lnlilratlon • Bon 19000A • lo h n so n City, T e n n e n e e 37614-0002 • (615)929-4415,4430

January 4, 19B5

William P. Abegglen
Department of Supervision
and Administration
East Tennessee State University
Box 19,000A
Johnson City, Tennessee 37614
Dear Colleague;
Several weeks ago 1 mailed you a letter asking that you assist me in
my doctoral studies at East Tennessee State University by completing a
survey instrument. This survey instrument was designed to determine the
knowledge of United States Supreme Court decisions affecting education
possessed by public school teachers, principals, superintendents, and
board members. Perhaps my original correspondence did not reach you or
you were unable to complete the instrument earlier.
If for some reason you have not completed and returned the survey
instrument I would appreciate it very much if you would take a few minutes
to complete the enclosed form and return it in the enclosed stamped
envelope.
Response will be reported by group totals only. You can be assured
that the information you provide will be kept strictly confidential and
that no individual will be identified in any way in the study.
Thank you very much for your assistance in conducting this study.

Sincerely yours,

William P. Abegglen
Doctoral Candidate
WPA:chc

C ollege of Education

VITA
WILLIAM PAUL ABEGGLEN

Personal Data:

Date of Birth:
Place of Birth:
Marital Status:

Bducation:

Public Schools, Olney, Illinois.
Lincoln Christian College, Lincoln, Illinois;
ministerial science, B.A., 1968.
Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, Illinois;
counseling and guidance, M.S. in Bducation, 1974.
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana;
counseling and quidance.
East Tennessee State University, Johnson City,
Tennessee; educational administration, Bd.D., 1985.

Professional
Experience:

Teacher and coach. Helmsburg Elementary School,
Brown County, Indiana, 1974-77.
Teacher, quidance counselor, and coach, Washington
College Academy, Washington College, Tennessee,
1978-80.
Doctoral Fellow, East Tennessee State University,
Johnson City, Tennessee, 1980-82.
Principal and teacher, Keokuk Christian Academy,
Keokuk, Iowa, 1982-present.

March 12, 1946
Olney, Illinois
Married to Sue Richardson Abegglen
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